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“when then ”  1 
 
 
§ The Sonnets  
1 3 4
The Sonnets young, youth old, age, decrepit
summer 14 4 1
3 2
153 4 fire
3, 5, 9, 14 key word 99 2  “sweet thief” “thy sweet” 
2 sweet  “sweet or colour” 
epanalepsis 2 7 10 stolen-steal
154
3  
Shakespeare  (intra-linear)  (inter-linear alliteration)




Is it for fear to wet a widow’s eye 
That thou consum'st thy self in single life? 
Ah, if thou issueless shalt hap to die 
The world will wail thee like a makeless wife. 
The world will be thy widow and still weep 
That thou no form of thee hast left behind, 
When every private widow well may keep, 
By children’s eyes, her husband’s shape in mind. 
Look what an unthrift in the world doth spend 
Shifts but his place, for still the world enjoys it; 
But beauty’s waste hath in the world an end, 
And kept unused the user so destroys it: 
No love toward others in that bosom sits 
That on himself such murd’rous shame commits. 
 
<w> 1 1 4
2 <w> 5 14
world widow 5 3
 




9 Vendler (1997)  (1974) 3  “Ah!” 
 (1971) Duncan-Jones (1997) Burrow (2002)  “Ah,” 1609  “Ah;” 
135 1609  “Will” will
Sonnets  Burrow 
 
― 4―
3 wet, wail, weep, 
waste <w>
<w>






As a decrepit father takes delight 
To see his active child do deeds of youth, 
So I, made lame by Fortune’s dearest spite, 
Take all my comfort of thy worth and truth. 
For whether beauty, birth, or wealth, or wit, 
Or any of these all, or all, or more, 
Entitled in thy parts, do crowned sit, 
I make my love engrafted to this store. 
So then I am not lame, poor, nor despised, 
Whilst that this shadow doth such substance give 
That I in thy abundance am sufficed, 
And by a part of all thy glory live. 
Look what is best, that best I wish in thee;  
This wish I have, then ten times happy me. 
 
1 2 4 youth truth
4 worth =merit  thy worth and truth” binominal
2 4
5  –th  (consonance) 
5  “beauty, birth, or wealth, or wit,” beauty birth wealth wit
6  –th 10 3 doth
7 2  
 
youth  
  youth   
  thy worth   
birth beauty wealth truth   wit  
 
youth 1  
  thy worth    
youth truth birth beauty wealth  
 
 
3 Duncan-Jones (1997, p. 128)  “The alliteration has a somewhat theatrical effect of emphasis.” 
Vendler (1997, p.84) 1609  <widdow> w-i-d-d-o-w <w> double-
u Shakespeare <w><u>  
4  (1971, p. 103) 4 truth  true, truth  sincerity, 
loyalty, genuineness, uprightness, closeness to an ideal pattern 
 (2018, p. 89) 5. Birth, wealth  “the fair youth” 
Duncan-Jones (p. 184) “4 worth and truth Since [Sonnets] 33-6 have dealt with the young man’s 
betrayal of his friend, his sensual fault (35.9) and blots (36. 3), the celebration here of his worth and truth must entail an 
appropriation of the young man’s weakness so effective that he can now be regarded as faultless.”   
― 5―
Will Sonnets 135 136 will  
 
CXXXV. 
Whoever hath her wish, thou hast thy Will, 
And Will to boot, and Will in over-plus; 
More than enough am I that vexed thee still, 
To thy sweet will making addition thus. 
Wilt thou, whose will is large and spacious, 
Not once vouchsafe to hide my will in thine? 
Shall will in others seem right gracious, 
And in my will no fair acceptance shine? 
The sea, all water, yet receives rain still, 
And in abundance addeth to his store; 
So thou, being rich in Will, add to thy Will 
One will of mine, to make thy large Will more. 
Let ‘no’ unkind, no fair beseechers kill: 
Think all but one, and me in that one Will. 
 
CXXXVI. 
If thy soul check thee that I come so near, 
Swear to thy blind soul that I was thy Will, 
And will, thy soul knows, is admitted there: 
Thus far for love my love-suit, sweet, fulfil. 
Will will fulfil the treasure of thy love, 
Ay, fill it full with wills, and my will one. 
In things of great receipt with ease we prove 
Among a number one is reckoned none; 
Then in the number let me pass untold, 
Though in thy store’s account I one must be; 
For nothing hold me, so it please thee hold 
That nothing me, a something sweet to thee. 
Make but my name thy love, and love that still, 
And then thou lov’st me for my name is Will. 
 
2 will 14 7 William
will 135
still, kill 136 4-6 full
fill 5-6 13-14 love 6
5 
  19  
 
XIX. 
Devouring Time, blunt thou the lion’s paws, 
And make the earth devour her own sweet brood, 
Pluck the keen teeth from the fierce tiger’s jaws, 
And burn the long-lived phoenix in her blood, 
Make glad and sorry seasons as thou fleet’st, 
And do whate’er thou wilt, swift-footed Time, 
To the wide world and all her fading sweets: 
But I forbid thee one most heinous crime, 
O! carve not with thy hours my love’s fair brow, 
 
5 Duncan-Jones (p. 386)  “5 Will will fulfill  ‘William/sexual desire will gratify’: the threefold –ill sound creates a comic 
or satirical effect, as well as hinting at the ‘ill’ or evil nature of what is proposed.”  
― 6―
Nor draw no lines there with thine antique pen. 
Him in thy course untainted do allow 
For beauty’s pattern to succeeding men.  
Yet, do thy worst, old Time: despite thy wrong, 
My love shall in my verse ever live young. 
 
3 2 4 3 Burrow
7 8 12
2
1 6 13 Time
1609 2
time  “ould Time” Burrow 3
Joshua Poole, English Parnassus 1657, p.207
Shakespeare
6 2  “old Time”
2  “My love shall in my verse ever live young.” young
30  “And with 
old woes new wail my dear time’s waste;” old new 1
400  
The Sonnets 
19 yet 7 
71 the world (3)  




Vendler (p.148) 26 5 witness, wit, wit




Lord of my love, to whom in vassalage 
Thy merit hath my duty strongly knit, 
To thee I send this written ambassage 
To witness duty, not to show my wit; 
Duty so great, which wit so poor as mine 
May make seem bare, in wanting words to show it, 
But that I hope some good conceit of thine 
In thy soul’s thought (all naked) will bestow it: 
 
6 Poole  “Time” aged, eating, feathered, fleeting, flying, stealing, swift-winged, winged
devouring, swift-footed Shakespeare 19  
7 Duncan-Jones (p. 148) “old Time”  “the poet acknowledges time’s antiquity, with capitalization that may 
be authorial, but also, as he approaches his solution to the problem of time’s power, feels able to address him colloquially as 
an ‘old fellow’. ” old “old boy”
The Oxford English Dictionary (on-line)  old boy
Shakespeare Ben Johnson “1602 B. Jonson Poetaster iii. iv. sig. F Thou shalt impart the wine, 
Old boy ” 3 old  
 
― 7―
Till whatsoever star that guides my moving 
Points on me graciously with fair aspect, 
And puts apparel on my tottered loving 
To show me worthy of thy sweet respect. 
Then may I dare to boast how I do love thee; 
Till then, not show my head where thou mayst prove me. 
26 1
4
witness wit 2 knit
(apophasis, depulsio) wit
 Vendler  “This showy nonshowing and not-
as-yet showing” (p. 148) 2 “wit so poor”
6 8
 “show it” “bestow it” it wit
<w>  wit
1 wit Vendler
10  with 12 sweet  wit
6  “wanting words” 4
 (interlinear alliteration) 2 wit  
 
and 66  
 
LXVI. 
Tired with all these, for restful death I cry: 
As to behold desert a beggar born, 
And needy nothing trimm’d in jollity, 
And purest faith unhappily forsworn, 
And gilded honour shamefully misplaced, 
And maiden virtue rudely strumpeted, 
And right perfection wrongfully disgraced, 
And strength by limping sway disabled 
And art made tongue-tied by authority, 
And folly, doctor-like, controlling skill, 
And simple truth miscalled simplicity, 
And captive good attending captain ill. 
Tired with all these, from these would I be gone, 
Save that, to die, I leave my love alone. 
 
10  (anaphora) and  “Tired with all these” 
 (cataphoric) 13  (anaphoric) 






8 Duncan-Jones (p. 512)  “tired with all these”  epimone  
― 8―
9  and  Vendler and
10 
4 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-14
why 3 67 2 5 7 3
9 why 2 2 4  
 
§ when then  
Shakespeare Sonnets 1 3 12
4
when then 154
when 10 2, 12, 15, 29, 30, 43, 64, 88, 106, 138 1 2
when-then 2  
 
II. 
When forty winters shall besiege thy brow, 
And dig deep trenches in thy beauty’s field, 
Thy youth’s proud livery so gazed on now 
Will be a tattered weed of small worth held:  
Then, being asked where all thy beauty lies, 
Where all the treasure of thy lusty days, 
To say within thine own deep-sunken eyes 
Were an all-eating shame, and thriftless praise. 
How much more praise deserv’d thy beauty’s use 
If thou couldst answer ‘This fair child of mine 
Shall sum my count, and make my old excuse’, 
Proving his beauty by succession thine. 
This were to be new made when thou art old, 
And see thy blood warm when thou feel’st it cold. 
 
1 2 then where  “Ubi sunt” 
when-then, 
where-where  when 
 
106 when  then  “I see” 
11 13  “they looked”  “we…behold” 
― 12
15 64 3 1
 “wasted time”  
 
CVI.  
When in the chronicle of wasted time 
I see descriptions of the fairest wights, 
And beauty making beautiful old rhyme 
In praise of ladies dead, and lovely knights; 
Then in the blazon of sweet beauty’s best, 
 
9  (p. 148) Lear 3.2, Fool  ‘prophecy’  
10 “The sonnet “comes alive” only if readers “animate” it by reflecting, as each character in the masque passes by, on the 
contemporary face they would attach to each personage.” (The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets. 1997, p. 310) 
― 9―
Of hand, of foot, of lip, of eye, of brow, 
I see their antique pen would have expressed 
Even such a beauty as you master now. 
So all their praises are but prophecies 
Of this our time, all you prefiguring, 
And, for they looked but with divining eyes, 
They had not skill enough your worth to sing: 
For we, which now behold these present days, 
Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues to praise. 
 
1 2 2 when




When I consider every thing that grows 
Holds in perfection but a little moment; 
That this huge stage presenteth naught but shows, 
Whereon the stars in secret influence comment; 
When I perceive that men as plants increase, 
Cheered and checked even by the self-same sky, 
Vaunt in their youthful sap, at height decrease, 
And wear their brave state out of memory; 
Then the conceit of this inconstant stay 
Sets you most rich in youth before my sight, 
Where wasteful time debateth with decay 
To change your day of youth to sullied night, 
And all in war with Time for love of you, 
As he takes from you, I engraft you new. 
 
15 1 2 4 3 9 Then
8 6 2 time






When to the sessions of sweet silent thought 
I summon up remembrance of things past, 
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought, 
And with old woes new wail my dear time’s waste; 
Then can I drown an eye (unused to flow) 
For precious friends hid in death’s dateless night, 
And weep afresh love’s long-since-cancelled woe, 
And moan th’ expense of many a vanished sight; 
Then can I grieve at grievances fore-gone, 
And heavily from woe to woe tell o’er 
The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan, 
Which I new pay as if not paid before. 
But if the while I think on thee (dear friend) 
All losses are restored and sorrows end. 
 
when then
 “When I consider…” “When I perceive…”  “When I summon up remembrance” “Then can I 
― 10 ―
drown an eye” “Then can I grieve” 
1 1-2 3-4 “I sigh” 
5  “Then can I drown an eye” I weep 7 moan







43 when 3 2
when
 [ait] bright, light, night, 
sight(less) 10 when  
 
XLIII. 
When most I wink, then do mine eyes best see, 
For all the day they view things unrespected, 
But when I sleep, in dreams they look on thee, 
And darkly bright, are bright in dark directed. 
Then thou, whose shadow shadows doth make bright, 
How would thy shadow’s form form happy show, 
To the clear day with thy much clearer light, 
When to unseeing eyes thy shade shines so? 
How would (I say) mine eyes be blessed made 
By looking on thee in the living day, 
When in dead night thy fair imperfect shade 
Through heavy sleep on sightless eyes doth stay? 
All days are nights to see till I see thee, 
And nights bright days when dreams do show thee me. 
 





When I do count the clock that tells the time, 
And see the brave day sunk in hideous night; 
When I behold the violet past prime, 
And sable curls, all silvered o’er with white;  
When lofty trees I see barren of leaves, 
Which erst from heat did canopy the herd, 
And summer’s green all girded up in sheaves, 
Borne on the bier with white and bristly beard, 
Then of thy beauty do I question make, 
That thou among the wastes of time must go, 
Since sweets and beauties do themselves forsake, 
And die as fast as they see others grow, 
And nothing ’gainst Time’s scythe can make defence 
Save breed to brave him when he takes thee hence. 
 
12 64  “when-then” 
154
― 11 ―
1  “count the clock that tells the time” [k] 3 [t] 4 ticktack
Vendler when I  “I 
do count” “and (I) see” “I behold” “I see”  “When I see” 









64 then  
 
LXIV. 
When I have seen by Time’s fell hand defaced 
The rich proud cost of outworn buried age, 
When sometime lofty towers I see down razed 
And brass eternal slave to mortal rage; 
When I have seen the hungry ocean gain 
Advantage on the kingdom of the shore, 
And the firm soil win of the wat’ry main, 
Increasing store with loss, and loss with store; 
When I have seen such interchange of state, 
Or state itself confounded to decay, 
Ruin hath taught me thus to ruminate, 
That Time will come and take my love away.  
This thought is as a death which cannot choose 
But weep to have that which it fears to lose. 
 
64 12 1 3 5 when 3
12 3 9 then 64
9 when then 11 12  “Ruin hath taught 
me thus to ruminate/ That Time will come and take my love away.” 1  “When I have 
seen by Time's fell hand defaced” 12 Time
epanalepsis
when 4
12  when “I do count” “I behold” “I see”
64  see 3
time 12 1 10 13
64 1 12 (envelop pattern) 
 (epanalepsis) 
 “Time’s fell hand” 12  





Burrow 12 13  “Times sieth”[ ] 64
1  “times fell hand” 
― 12 ―
60
8 9 8  And 9
60 12  “his sieth to mow” 14  “his cruell hand” 
his
12  “Time’s scythe”  (attribute) 
 Time 1





XII, XV, XXX, CIV
XII, LXIV, CVI when then time
 
 
Colin Burrow  (2007) 
 
 
“The sonnets invite close inward attention. Their language seems to slip in sense from line to line and from 
phrase to phrase: probably if you do not find at least four different currents of meaning in each line you have 














11 60  “cruel hand” 12 ”fell hand” Twelfth Night 1 1 Orsino
Olivia  (hart)  (heart) 
 “That instant was I turned into a hart, And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds, E’er 
since pursue me.” (Dover Wilson ) fell cruel binominal  
12  
Editing the Sonnets Sonnets
sonnets Editor 4 Kerrigan, Vendler, 
Burrow, Duncan-Jones critical attitude Editor
Editors do dreadful things to texts. That is 
their job.  principle
Burrow 
…probably if you do not find at least four different currents of meaning in each line you have missed 
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1971 p. i 154







 “And summer’s lease hath all too short a date:”
2007 pp. 
276-277  “Shall 













Petrarch abbaabba cdecde cdcdcd
Shakespeare abab cdcd efef gg
Spenser abab bcbc cdcd ee
Wyatt 1503-42 abab cdcd efef gg








and Brogan eds. 1993, pp. 1167-1169  
2 4
Vendler 1997,  p. 22 Shakespeare
4 successive and equal hierarchical contrastive
analogous logically contradictory successively “louder” or “softer”
6  
A Companion to Shakespeare’s Sonnets Michael Schoenfeldt Introduction
the profoundly comforting 
rhythm 2
identifying a problem or situation in the first quatrain, discussing it in the two subsequent 
quatrains, and resolving, restating, or revealing an essential paradox in the couplet
As one reads 
through the sequence, one senses a developing aura of logical inevitability about the final couplet
Schoenfeldt Schoenfeldt ed. 2007, p. 6  
1974 3 Shakespeare
quatrain pause 63 99 154 4
quatrain quatrain
climax couplet
1974 p. viii  
1979 Tucker Brooke (Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets (Oxford University Press, 1936)) 
summary reversion addition 3  
3
1974 3
180 1979 p. 138  
 
 
   
1  
2 3  
3, 5, 17, 28, 32, 36, 60, 69, 92, 96, 98, 
118, 127, 133, 139, 144, 149, 153, 154 
2  12
 
7, 12, 19, 30, 33, 34, 42, 53, 65, 66, 74, 











2 1979, pp. 287-288 3 Sonnet 98 1 3
 “Yet seemed it winter still, and, you away, / As with your shadow I with these did play.” 13
 “Yet”  “Yet” 
1 2 19 33 127 98
































My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun,  
Coral is far more red than her lips’ red:  
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun;  
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.  
I have seen roses damasked, red and white,  
But no such roses see I in her cheeks,  
And in some perfumes is there more delight  
Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.  
I love to hear her speak, yet well I know  
That music hath a far more pleasing sound.  
I grant I never saw a goddess go:   
My mistress when she walks treads on the ground.  
And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare  







 “And yet” 13
1986 p. 267 3
sun











Cupid laid by his brand and fell asleep.  
A maid of Dian’s this advantage found,  
And his love-kindling fire did quickly steep  
In a cold valley-fountain of that ground,  
Which borrowed from this holy fire of love  
A dateless lively heat still to endure,  
And grew a seething bath, which yet men prove  
Against strange maladies a sovereign cure.  
But at my mistress’ eye love’s brand new fired,   
The boy for trial needs would touch my breast.  
I, sick withal, the help of bath desired,  
And thither hied, a sad distempered guest,  
But found no cure; the bath for my help lies   





Duncan-Jones, ed., 1997, p. 374 1971, pp. 155-156
wires Spenser 
Epithalamion (1595)  ‘Her long loose yellow locks like golden wire.’  
4 Shakespeare Sonnet 21 21
“my love is as fair / As any mother’s child, 










Full many a glorious morning have I seen  
Flatter the mountain tops with sovereign eye,  
Kissing with golden face the meadows green,  
Gilding pale streams with heavenly alchemy,  
Anon permit the basest clouds to ride  
With ugly rack on his celestial face,  
And from the forlorn world his visage hide,  
Stealing unseen to west with this disgrace:   
Even so my sun one early morn did shine  
With all triumphant splendour on my brow;  
But out alack, he was but one hour mine,  
The region cloud hath masked him from me now.  
Yet him for this my love no whit disdaineth:  







“the forlorn world” 7




133   
Beshrew that heart that makes my heart to groan  
For that deep wound it gives my friend and me.  
Is’t not enough to torture me alone,  
But slave to slavery my sweet’st friend must be?  
Me from myself thy cruel eye hath taken,  
And my next self thou harder hast engrossèd.  
 
5 1996, p. 115  “forlorn” Burrow




Of him, myself, and thee I am forsaken,  
A torment thrice threefold thus to be crossèd.  
Prison my heart in thy steel bosom’s ward,   
But then my friend’s heart let my poor heart bail,  
Whoe’er keeps me, let my heart be his guard;  
Thou canst not then use rigour in my jail.  
And yet thou wilt, for I, being pent in thee,  
Perforce am thine, and all that is in me.  
 
133  “thou” 
 Dark Lady 
thy steel bosom’s ward 9 slavery
4
Lakoff 1987, p. 450










That you were once unkind befriends me now,  
And for that sorrow, which I then did feel,  
Needs must I under my transgression bow,  
Unless my nerves were brass or hammered steel.  
For if you were by my unkindness shaken,  
As I by yours, y’ have passed a hell of time,  
And I, a tyrant, have no leisure taken  
To weigh how once I suffered in your crime.  
O that our night of woe might have rememb’red  
My deepest sense how hard true sorrow hits,  
And soon to you, as you to me then, tend’red  
The humble salve, which wounded bosoms fits!  
But that your trespass now becomes a fee;  





6 Duncan-Jones ed., 1997, p. 120 120  “Reminding himself of how he felt when his friend 
betrayed him, the speaker finds pain in the recollection of his anguish, but comfort in the thought of his own forgiveness at 















When I do count the clock that tells the time,  
And see the brave day sunk in hideous night;  
When I behold the violet past prime,  
And sable curls all silvered o’er with white;   
When lofty trees I see barren of leaves,   
Which erst from heat did canopy the herd,  
And summer’s green all girded up in sheaves,  
Borne on the bier with white and bristly beard:  
Then of thy beauty do I question make,  
That thou among the wastes of time must go,  
Since sweets and beauties do themselves forsake,  
And die as fast as they see others grow,  
  And nothing ’gainst Time’s scythe can make defence  















7 Lakoff and Turner (1989, p. 41) TIME IS A REAPER Shakespeare 







Devouring Time, blunt thou the lion’s paws,  
And make the earth devour her own sweet brood,  
Pluck the keen teeth from the fierce tiger’s jaws,  
And burn the long-lived phoenix in her blood,  
Make glad and sorry seasons as thou fleet’st,  
And do whate’er thou wilt, swift-footed Time,  
To the wide world and all her fading sweets:  
But I forbid thee one most heinous crime,  
O carve not with thy hours my love’s fair brow,  
Nor draw no lines there with thine antique pen.  
Him in thy course untainted do allow  
For beauty’s pattern to succeeding men.   
Yet do thy worst, old Time: despite thy wrong,  









Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,  
So do our minutes hasten to their end,  
Each changing place with that which goes before,  
In sequent toil all forwards do contend.  
Nativity, once in the main of light,  
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crowned,  
Crookèd eclipses ’gainst his glory fight,  
And Time that gave doth now his gift confound.  
Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth,  
And delves the parallels in beauty’s brow,  
Feeds on the rarities of nature’s truth,  
And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow.  
And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand,  
Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand.  
 
12 19 60 confound transfix
 
9 Lakoff and Turner (1989, pp. 41-43) TIME IS A DEVOURER
TIME IS A DESTROYER Shakespeare 19  
“Devouring Time”  “Does it really exist, Time, the destroyer? / When will it crush 
the fortress on the peaceful height? (Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, 2)  
10 55  “Not marble, nor the gilded monuments / Of princes shall outlive this pow’rful rhyme, / But you shall shine 
more bright in these contents / Than unswept stone besmeared with sluttish time.” (ll. 1-4) 63  “His beauty shall 
in these black lines be see, / And they shall live, and hi in them, still green.” (ll. 13-14) 65  “in black ink my love 




feed delve scythe mow
60











Mine eye hath played the painter and hath stelled  
Thy beauty’s form in table of my heart;  
My body is the frame wherein ’tis held,  
And perspective that is best painter’s art,  
For through the painter must you see his skill  
To find where your true image pictured lies,  
Which in my bosom’s shop is hanging still,  
That hath his windows glazèd with thine eyes.  
Now see what good turns eyes for eyes have done:  
Mine eyes have drawn thy shape, and thine for me  
Are windows to my breast, wherethrough the sun  
Delights to peep, to gaze therein on thee.   
Yet eyes this cunning want to grace their art:  








best painter’s art 4
2
cunning 11




Why didst thou promise such a beauteous day,  
And make me travel forth without my cloak,  
To let base clouds o’ertake me in my way,  
Hiding thy brav’ry in their rotten smoke?  
’Tis not enough that through the cloud thou break  
To dry the rain on my storm-beaten face,  
For no man well of such a salve can speak  
That heals the wound and cures not the disgrace;  
Nor can thy shame give physic to my grief:  
Though thou repent, yet I have still the loss.  
Th’ offender’s sorrow lends but weak relief  
To him that bears the strong offence’s cross.   
Ah, but those tears are pearl which thy love sheds,  







11 13  “cunning”  “skill, insight” Duncan-Jones ed., 1997, p.158  
12 Burrow (ed., 2002, p. 428) 
“The note of doubt here (what is the lover thinking?) anticipates later poems.”  
13 Burrow (ed., 2002, p. 448)  13  “Throughout the poem the friend is responding to the poet’s 









When to the sessions of sweet silent thought  
I summon up remembrance of things past,  
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,  
And with old woes new wail my dear time’s waste;   
Then can I drown an eye (unused to flow)  
For precious friends hid in death’s dateless night,  
And weep afresh love’s long since cancelled woe,  
And moan th’ expense of many a vanished sight;  
Then can I grieve at grievances fore-gone,  
And heavily from woe to woe tell o’er  
The sad account of fore-bemoanèd moan,  
Which I new pay as if not paid before.  
But if the while I think on thee (dear friend)  
All losses are restored, and sorrows end.  
 







friend’s guilt, since they show that he is willing to identify himself not just with the sovereign sun, but also with the clouds 
that produce rain (or tears).” 
 
14 Duncan-Jones (ed., 1997, p. 34)  “pearl” “= made of pearl” 
13 46  
15 Burrow ed., 2002, p. 440  “sessions” OED “A continuous series of sittings or meetings 





























Shakespeare Sonnets  
 
Shakespeare






16 “[O]ne potential source of richness and power in great poetry is the confluence of a number of basic metaphorical 
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4 Sonnets50 51 5
(adaption) 6 50
 





How heavy do I journey on the way, 
When what I seek (my weary travel’s end) 
Doth teach that ease and that repose to say, 
‘Thus far the miles are measured from thy friend.’ 
The beast that bears me, tirèd with my woe, 
Plods dully on, to bear that weight in me, 
As if by some instìnct the wretch did know 
His rider loved not speed being made from thee: 
The bloody spur cannot provoke him on, 
That sometimes anger thrusts into his hide, 
Which heavily he answers with a groan 
More sharp to me than spurring to his side; 
For that same groan doth put this in my mind:  
My grief lies onward and my joy behind. 
 























50 ABABCDCDEFEFGG (iambic pentameter) 14
(3 quatrains 1 closing couplet) A:way,say (/ei/) B:end, friend(/end/)




L4 “miles”, “measured”  L5“beast”  “bears”  L6 “sharp, spurring, side”
(alliteration) 12 “sh”, “s” L1heavy, 
journey  L3 ease, repose L8 loved, speed, made, (rhyme)  
 
1.3. 
(antithesis) L3 ease / L2 
weary  L14 grief / L14 joy,L14 onward / L14 behind (2019) grief
joy 50 42  
50 (synesthesia) L12-13
 
L8“bloody spur” (transferred epithet)
‘bloody’ (
,2004;52)  
L4‘Thus far the miles are measured from thy friend.’ Journey 
(irony) ( 3.1 ) (paradox) L8 His rider loved not speed being made 
from thee: “make”  “forward motion” (Booth,1978;217)1 3
2
(Kerrigan,ibid; 79-80)  







1 How heavy do I journey on the way, 
2 When what I seek (my weary travel’s end) 
3 Doth teach that ease and that repose to say, 
4 ‘Thus far the miles are measured from thy friend.’ 
5  The beast that bears me, tirèd with my woe, 
6  Plods dully on, to bear that weight me, 
7  As if by some instìnct the wretch did know 
8  His rider loved not speed being made from thee: 
9  The bloody spur cannot provoke him on, 
10 That sometimes anger thrusts into his hide, 
11 Which heavily he answers with a groan, 
12 More sharp to me than spurring to his side; 
13       For that same groan doth put this in my mind: 
14       My grief lies onward and my joy behind. 
 1   
1 that, this, doth L3 L13 (symmetry)
L13 empty syllables (that, same, doth ) (Booth,ibid;217)
L2-4 L13-14 ( ) (Booth,ibid;217)
on (online1)  
 
1 Nay, rather every tedious stride I make / Will but remember me what a deal of world / I ander from the jewels that I love. / 





1 How heavy do I journey on the way, 
2 When what I seek (my weary travel’s end) 
3 Doth teach that ease and that repose to say, 
4 ‘Thus far the miles are measured from thy friend.’ 
5  The beast that bears me, tirèd with my woe, 
6  Plods dully on, to bear that weight in me, 
7  As if by some instìnct the wretch did know 
8  His rider loved not speed being made from thee: 
9  The bloody spur cannot provoke him on 
10 That sometimes anger thrusts into his hide, 
11 Which heavily he answers with a groan, 
12 More sharp to me than spurring to his side; 
13       For that same groan doth put this in my mind: 
14       My grief lies onward and my joy behind. 
2   
2 (hypogram)  “way, when, what, 
weary, woe, weight, wretch”( )
“woe”
he
( )  “horse” hypogram






5 “tired”  “me”  “beast”
(Evans,ibid.) 9 “The bloody spur cannot provoke him on” “him”
8  the beast it ( ,2018;114) him
9 him “Common sense says that him refer to the 
horse, but the grammatical antecedent is His rider; the vagueness of designation furthers the ongoing 
process of identifying the horse with the rider.”(Booth,ibid;217) 50
 “beast”  “wretch”  “he”  “beast”






 3 ( ) 
“wretch” 14  “the 
The beast the wretch he(him, his)
― 32 ―
wretch” “the wretch”  “rider”  “The Poet”





“the wretch”  “beast” “he”
( ,2004;53) (
,1967;102)  
 “poor creature” (without pejorative weight)(Evans,ibid.)
OED “wretch” ( d. Applied to animals, birds, or insects.)
“e. A person or little creature. (Used 
as a term of playful depreciation, or to denote slight commiseration or pity.)” 1599





Othello(1622)  “Excellent 








 1.  
2. ;[ ]  
 1. (miserable person) 
2. (scoudrel) ( ) (rogue)★
 
 ; [joc]2 




2 [joc] “wretch” (jocular)
50
 
3 Amazing grace, how sweet the sound/ That saved 
a wretch like me/I once was lost but now I'm found/We blind but now I see
 “wretch”  “That 
― 33 ―
2.2. 
3 2  
2  
horse and rider should function as one 
lover beloved are one 
horse mistress /rider lover 
 
horse and rider should function as one 
 
“The horse thinks one thing and he that saddles him another”
(proverb)  
Astrophil and Stella(1591) 49 (Kerrigan,ibid.)  






Thus can my love excuse the slow offence 
Of my dull bearer, when from thee I speed: 
From where thou art, why should I haste me thence? 
Till I return, of posting is no need. 
O what excuse will my poor beast then find, 
When swift extremity can seem but slow? 
Then should I spur though mounted on the wind, 
In wingèd speed no motion shall I know: 
Then can no horse with my desire keep pace; 
Therefore desire (of perfect’st love being made) 
Shall neigh (no dull flesh) in his fiery race, 
But love, for love, thus shall excuse my jade: 
    Since from thee going he went willful slow, 


























saved a wretch like me”
“wretch” “wretch”
 







lover beloved are one 
lover beloved are one Sonnets36.2 “Although 
our undivided lovers are one:”  
 
horse mistress /rider lover 
horse mistress /rider lover 5  
(











“spur” “I.A device to incite a horse to move forward”









joy                                  grief 
joy                               grief 






50 50  “LOVE 
IS A JOURNEY” (irony)




( ,2009;70)  “Most worthy comfort, now my greatest grief,” 
 “The goal of the relationship is the 
destination of a journey”(Kövecses,ibid;7)
 “grief”  “joy”
50 “joy”
 “grief”  
 
3.2.  
HAPPY IS UP SAD IS DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson,1980;15)












   
 →    
 →  















 →  
 →  
 →  






L5 “tirèd with” L7 “the wretch know”









 →  
 →  
 →  
 →  
   









Kerrigan  “neigh”  
 
 Thus can my love excuse the slow offence 
Of my dull bearer, when from thee I speed: 
From where thou art, why should I haste me thence? 
Till I return, of posting is no need. 
O what excuse will my poor beast then find, 
When swift extremity can seem but slow? 
Then should I spur though mounted on the wind, 





Then can no horse with my desire keep pace; 
Therefore desire (of perfect’st love being made) 
Shall neigh (no dull flesh) in his fiery race, 
But love, for love, thus shall excuse my jade: 
      Since from thee going he went willful slow, 
      Towards thee I’ll run, and give him leave to go 







51  “neigh” 51 L13
“willful slow” 50 “unwilling fastness”  




 50  51  
 (wariness) (desire) 
   
 groan neigh(Kerrigan, ibid.) 
 Unwilling fastness L13willfull slow 
Thus  Thus  For Thus Then Then But Since 
3  50 51  





1 How heavy do I journey on the way, 
2 When what I seek (my weary travel’s end) 
3 Doth teach that ease and that repose to say, 
4 ‘Thus far the miles are measured from thy friend.’ 
5 The beast that bears me, tirèd with my woe, 
6 Plods dully on, to bear that weight in me, 
7 As if by some instìnct the wretch did know 
8 His rider loved not speed being made from thee: 
9 The bloody spur cannot provoke him on, 
10 That sometimes anger thrusts into his hide, 
11 Which heavily he answers with a groan, 
12 More sharp to me than spurring to his side, 
13   For that same groan doth put this in my mind, 



















5.7 10 L4 
m  L5 b
 
L5  “me”




L7 L7 As if by some instìnct the wretch did know








L8 His rider loved not speed being made from thee: (
,1934;81) 12 
L12-13 (synesthesia) 





2 2.1  “wretch”
2.2 50
2.3 3
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147 4  
 
2. 147  
147
Evans ed. 2006:100  
 
My love is as a fever, longing still 
For that which longer nurseth the disease, 
Feeding on that which doth preserve the ill, 
Th’uncertain sickly appetite to please. 
My reason, the physician to my love, 
Angry that his prescriptions are not kept, 
Hath left me, and I desperate now approve 
Desire is death, which physic did except. 
Past cure I am, now reason is past care, 
And, frantic mad with evermore unrest, 
My thoughts and my discourse as madmen’s are, 
At random from the truth vainly expressed: 
    For I have sworn thee fair, and thought thee bright, 






“fever” “ill / disease”
“Th uncertain sickly appetite”
 
5 2 “physician”
“My reason” “prescriptions” “I”
“physic 
did except” “desire”  
















3. 147  
7 alliteration
polyptoton enjambment antithesis parallelism





[l] love (1), longing (1), longer (2) 
[d] desperate (7), Desire (8), death (8), did (8) 
[p] Past (9), past (9) 
[k] cure (9), care (9) 
[m] mad (10), My (11), my (11), madmen’s (11) 




5 “physician” 8 “physic”
2
“doctor” “medicine”  
147 1 7 8
“ and I desperate now approve / Desire is death, …”
 
2 “fair” “black” “bright” “dark”
3
2 3  
 
1 4 5 8 9 12 13 14 4
147 1
“and” “,” 2








Leech and Short 2007:48  4 “Th uncertain sickly appetite to please.”
10 “And, frantic mad with evermore unrest,”
 
1 Leech and Short 2007:48
 
 
 My love       longing still for  that which  nurseth longer  the disease 
     [= a fever]     feeding on      that which  doth preserve   the ill 
                      in order  to please th’uncertain sickly appetite 
 
 My reason                   (is) angry      that his prescriptions are not kept 
     [= the physician to my love]     hath left       me 
 
 I                           (am) desperate  now 
     [= (the patient)]               approve       (that) Desire [which physic did except] is death 
 
  I      am  past  cure 
reason  is   past  care now 
 
     (I am) frantic mad with evermore unrest 
 
My  thoughts            
      my  discourse               are (mad)   as madmen’s (thoughts and discourse) 
                                 expressed   vainly at random from the truth 
 
 For I have  sworn   thee  fair 
               thought  thee  bright 
                       who art  as black as   hell 
                               as dark as    night 
 






4. 147  
4.1  
 “fever”, “disease”, “ill”, “sickly”, “physician”, “prescriptions”, “death”, 
“physic”, “cure” “My love is as a fever” simile “My reason, the physician to 


































 “longing ”  
 




 “hath left me”  
 






























 “My love”  
=  
 
 “I”  
=  
=  / 
 
 





















































5. sonnet  
5.1  118  
147
118 118
1986:163 164  
 
Like as to make our appetites more keen 
With eager compounds we our palate urge, 
As to prevent our maladies unseen 
We sicken to shun sickness when we purge: 
Even so, being full of your ne’er-cloying sweetness, 
To bitter sauces did I frame my feeding,  
And, sick of welfare, found a kind of meetness 
To be diseased ere that there was true needing. 
Thus policy in love, t’anticipate 
The ills that were not, grew to faults assured, 
And brought to medicine a healthful state 
Which, rank of goodness, would by ill be cured. 
But thence I learn, and find the lesson true, 

















“being full of your ne’er-cloying sweetness”, “sick of welfare”, “rank of goodness”, 






“shun sickness”  
2



















































“full of  sweetness”  
“appetites”  
“eager compounds /  
bitter sauces”  















5.2  129  
129 147
129 1986:177–178  
 
Th’expense of spirit in a waste of shame 
Is lust in action, and till action, lust 
Is perjured, murd’rous, bloody, full of blame, 
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust, 
Enjoyed no sooner but despisèd straight, 
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had, 
Past reason hated as swallowed bait 
On purpose laid to make the taker mad: 
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so, 
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme, 
A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe, 
Before, a joy proposed, behind, a dream. 
― 47 ―
All this the world well knows, yet none knows well 

















129 “lust” “swallowed bait / On purpose 
laid to make the taker mad” “Past reason hunted”
“Past reason hated”





6. 147  
1976:296 297 1986:201–202 2004:137

























































































4 8 “Desire is death, 
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(2)  (3)(4) 40 5 
(2)   (2019)  
  
   
(3)  (794-1191) 14  
 
 (1192-1602) 11  
 
    
 
 
(4)  (-793) 2  
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5  (2019) (2) 































(1)   
10 (5) 












 (1200-1253) 12 
(8)  




 (11)  
(9)    
(10)  
       
(11)    333  
 
44 3244
 (12) 1 13 
 
12  (2013) 
 2009: 20
 (1965) 




















































 3098 488 
5  
 18 6 
 
 253 0  
 158 0  
 3651 42 1  
 1271 1 
 70 0  
 865 0  
 176 0  
 30 0  
 9590 537  
 







*( )  
     
 10 (6) 182 (177) 296 488 (479) 
 0 6 (3) 0 6 (3) 
 1 21 20 42 
 0 1 0 1 









5.2.2  (-793) 
11 8
2  (13) 16 (13) 
 
(13) 
     
4  
(14) * *  
      
(15)  
    
 
(14) 









        
― 59 ―
 
5.2.3  (794-1191) 





*( )  
      
 142 18 0 160  
 2 0 1 3  
 3 0 0 3  
 22 2 0 24  
 9 (5) 0 0 9 (5) 18  
 1 0 0 1  
 0 1 0 1  
 2 (1) 0 0 2 (1)  
 1 0 0 1  
 182 (177) 21 1 204 (199)  
 
 (2019)  
(16)  








 (2003)  (2014) 
(18) 
 





19  (2014) 
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, 1965: 291  
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1960 2021  (1 )  
(parallelism) 
1980
(Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2014; Lakoff 2014) 
 (Charteris-Black, 2014; Lakoff, 2006;  et al., 2006;
, 1956) 
(Charteris-Black, 2014; Gibbons et al., 2018; Lakoff, 2006)  
Silva Rhetoricae “Similarity 
of structure in a pair or series of related words, phrases, or clauses.”
 
 
(1)  a. parallelism of words: 
She tried to make her pastry fluffy, sweet, and delicate. 
    b. parallelism of phrases: 
Singing a song or writing a poem is joyous. 
    c. parallelism of clauses: 
Perch are inexpensive; cod are cheap; trout are abundant; but salmon are best. 
 
(1a) N A, A, and A “fluffy” “sweet” “delicate” 3
(1b) V-ing a N  ( “Singing a song” “writing a poem”) 
(1c) N V A 3 (1) 
 
 et al. (2006: 55) 
Gibbons et al. (2018)  “Syntactic parallelisms tend to suggest to readers that 
there is a relationship between the two parallel structures. In this way, readers are coerced into seeking 














12  (21359 ) AntConc n-gram
1) AntConc  (
50 ) (





1 50  
 1. America ( 28 ) 
2. nation ( 30 ) 
3. people ( 34 )  
 1. is ( 10 )  
2. are ( 16 )  
3. be ( 18 )  
4. have ( 21 ) 
5. has ( 37 ) 
6. do ( 36 )  
 1. will ( 12 )  
2. can ( 27 ) 
3. must ( 38 )  
 
 
 “the” ( 1 ) “America” ( 28 )
“nation” ( 30 ) “people” ( 34 )
  “is” ( 10 ) “are” ( 16 ) “be” ( 18 )
“have” ( 21 ) “has” ( 37 ) “do” ( 36 ) 50
“will” ( 12 )  “can” ( 27 )  “must” ( 38 )
be
 (Cavari, 2017)
 “may be” (n1=5)  “could be” (n=1)  “is” 
(n=12)  “are” (n=12)  “will” (n=12)  “must” (n=12) 
2  ( “of the” “we will” “of 
our” “in the” “and the” “the world” “ to the” “we are” “we have” “we are”) 
10 9  
3 3
 “of the world” “or our nation” “the American people” 
64% (n=7) 8  “the American 
people” 64%  “of the world”  “of our nation” 
 
3
4 4  “we will make 
                                                   
1 n  
― 67 ―
America” (  ( 5 )) “America at its best” ( W  ( 4 ))
“because of what we” (  ( 4 ))  “my whole soul is” (  (
3 ) 4
 
  5 6
5  “we will bring back our” (  (
4 )) “a new breeze is blowing” “new breeze is blowing and” ( H W  ( 3
)) “again we will make America” (  ( 3 )) “America at its best is” ( W
 ( 3 )) “to renew America we must” (  ( 3 )) “the will of the people” 
(  ( 3 )  
6 “a new breeze is blowing and” ( H W  (
3 )) “the fate that will fall on” (  ( 2 )) “all are born equal in dignity” (
M  ( 2 )) “am putting out my hand to” ( H W  ( 2
)) “are born equal in dignity before” (  ( 2 )) “be finished in the first one” ( F
 ( 2 )) “believe in a fate that will” (  ( 2 )) “by the common objects of their” 
(  ( 2 )) “defined by the common objects” (  ( 2 )) 7
 “in the whirlwind and directs this storm” ( W  ( 2 )) 8
2  
 
(  (1960 2021 ) )  
  














2.1 1960  
1961  “those who foolishly sought 
power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside” (
 ( )  
(“a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself”) 
 “Let us never 
negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate” A (negotiate) B (fear) B (fear) A 
(negotiate) 2 (chiasmus)  
(  ) 
“All this will not be finished in the first one hundred 
days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even 
                                                   
2 A B B A  ( , 1956: 76)  
― 68 ―





 “Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country” 
 (A (country)  B (you)  B (you) A (country)) 
 
(Great Society) 
 (“But change 
has given us new weapons”)  “Justice 
requires us to remember: when any citizen denies his fellow, saying: “His color is not mine or his beliefs 
are strange and different,” in that moment he betrays America” 
 “So let us reject any among us who seek to reopen old 
wounds and rekindle old hatreds” re-V old N
 
 “I do not believe that the Great Society is the ordered, 
changeless, and sterile battalion of the ants. It is the excitement of becoming—always becoming, trying, 




2.2 1970  
1970
 (“we can build a great cathedral of the spirit”) 
 (spirit) 
 “goodness” “decency” “love” “kindness”
“What remains is to give life to what is in the law: to ensure at last that as 
all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before man” all are born 
equal in dignity before N “What” 
 “This means black and white together, 
as one nation, not two” 
 “Let us take as our goal: where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, 
make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent” where N is V, make it A
 
(“To go forward at all is to go forward together” )  (“go forward” ) 
 
R
 “I am acutely aware that you have not elected me as your 
President by your ballot” 
“Not an inaugural address, not a fireside chat, not a campaign speech—just a little straight 
talk among friends.” ( ) 
not N 3
                                                   
3  ( , 
2003: 160)  
― 69 ―
 (triad) (  2019: 70)  4(aporia) 
 
“This inauguration ceremony marks a new beginning, a new dedication within our Government, and a 
new spirit among us all” a new N 3
A new N 1960 2021 35
 “a new beginning” “a new dedication” “a new sprit” 
 
“We are a purely 
idealistic Nation, but let no one confuse our idealism with weakness. Because we are free we can never be 
indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for these 
societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights” 
1 “idealistic”  “idealism”  “free”  “freedom”  5(polyptoton) 
 
 
2.3 1980  
 (“the economic ills” “economic 
affliction”)  “All 
of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the 
Federal Government” A (the Federal Government) B (the States) B (the States) A (the 
Federal Government) 
 
 (“Those who say that we’re in a time when there are not heroes”  “You can 
see heroes every day” ) 
 (“we’re too great a nation to 
limit ourselves to small dreams”) “I do not believe in a fate that will fall on us no 
matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing”  “a fate that will 





 (“a deadly bacteria”) 
“The most obvious now is drugs. And when that first cocaine was smuggled in 
on a ship, it may as well have been a deadly bacteria, so much has it hurt the body, the soul of our 
country” 
“For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom 
seems reborn”  “A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on” 
A new breeze is blowing, and a 
N refreshed by freedom  “freedom” 
 
 “freedom”  “We know what works: Freedom 
                                                   
4 
 ( , 2003: 99)  
5 root ( )  ( , 1957: 81)  
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works. We know what's right: Freedom is right” We know what V: freedom V
1 We know what V: freedom V 2
We know what V N: freedom V N
 (what X: freedom X)  “freedom” 
 “freedom is 
like a beautiful kite that can go higher and higher with the breeze” 
 
 
2.4 1990  
“we inherit an economy that is still the world's strongest but is weakened by 
business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our own people” 
 (“Our democracy must be not only the envy of the world but the 
engine of our own renewal”) 
(polyptoton)  (“we have drifted. And that drifting has eroded our resources, 
fractured our economy, and shaken our confidence”) 
 
“To renew America, we must be bold”
“To renew America, we must revitalize our democracy” “To renew America, we must meet challenges 
abroad as well as at home”  (To renew America, we must V ) 
 “We must provide for our Nation the way a family provides for its children” 
 (Lakoff, 2002) 
 
W “civility” ( ) 
10  “civility” 5  (J F K (1 ) W  (4 )) 
“America, at its best, matches a commitment to principle with a concern for civility. A civil society 
demands from each of us good will and respect, fair dealing and forgiveness” “civility”  
“civil” 
“America, at its best” “America, at its best, is also 
courageous” “America, at its best, is compassionate” “America, at its best, is a place where personal 
responsibility is valued and expected” 
 
 (“America's faith in 
freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many 
nations”) 
 “a seed” 





2.5 2000  
 (“journey” 3 “travel” 2 ) 
 6 (anaphora) 
 (“For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled 
across oceans in search of a new life. For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West; endured the 
lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth. For us, they fought and died, in places like Concord and 
Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sanh7”) For us, they V 3
 “Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are 
no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. 
Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and 




is the past. And now we are looking only to the future” 
“From this day 
forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this day forward, it’s going to be only America First” 
 “From this day forward” 
 “We will bring back our jobs. We will bring back our 
borders. We will bring back our wealth. And we will bring back our dreams” We will bring 
back our N 4 N
 “our”  (
) 
“your voice, your hopes, and your dreams, will 
define our American destiny”  your N
 
 2021 1 20
COVID-19
“This is America’s day”  “This is democracy’s day” This is N’s day
“Much to do, much to heal, much to restore, 
much to build and much to gain” much to V 5
 (“American story”) 
“But the American story depends not on any one of us, not 
some of us, but on all of us” N of us
                                                   
6 phrase clause  ( , 1956: 71)  
7 Concord ( ) Gettysburg ( ) Normandy ( ) Khe Sanh ( )  
8  (
) (  et al., 2006: 397)  
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“I will be a President for all Americans. All Americans.”  “All 
Americans”  “We must set aside politics and finally face this pandemic as one nation, one 
nation”  “one nation”  
 “My whole soul is in it today, on this January day. My whole 
soul is in this. Bringing America together, uniting our people, uniting our nation.” My whole soul 
is in N uniting our N 4
uniting our N
“Let's 
begin to listen to one another again, hear one another, see one another. Show respect to one another.” 
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John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
(1961 1 20 )  





















1963   7  
1963 11 46  
Lyndon Baines Johnson 
(1963 11 22 ) 













Richard Milhous Nixon 
(1969 1 20 ) 
all are born equal in 
dignity before N/ Where N 













Gerald Rudolph Ford 











1975 2  
James Earl Carter  
(1977 1 20 ) 












Ronald Wilson Reagan 
(1981 1 20 ) 














George Herbert Walker Bush 
(1989 1 20 ) 
A new breeze is blowing, 
and a N refreshed by 
freedom/ We know what V: 











William Jefferson Clinton 
(1993 1 20 ) 
To renew America, we 
















George Walker Bush 
(2001 1 20 ) 















Barack Hussein Obama 
(2009 1 20 ) 
















Donald John Trump 
(2017 1 20 ) 
We will bring back our N/ 







(2021 1 20 ) 
This is N’s day/ Much to 
V/ N of us/ My whole soul 
is in N/ uniting our N/ V 













 Adj + N(white lie) ,V + Adj (feel blue) 
 Adj + N   
 [N1 V (as ) adj. as 
N2. ] ”Her cheek is as red as rose.” 
”white lie” ”feel blue”
 





5 6  
 
2.  
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
 
 
2.1 Svartengren (1918), Moon (2008)  






(1)a. The highway soon became as straight as a bowstring. 
b. He stood up immediately, as straight as a fiddlestring. 
c. As straight as a thread.   
d. Straight as a surveyor’s line. 
e. He usually moves to his quarry as straight as a falcon.   (Svartengren 1918: 275) 
 
 




Moon (2008) Bank of English as-similes
 (ibid. 30) as-similes
 ( 5 )
Moon (2008)  
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2.3 (2016)  
(2016) Wierzbicka (1990) (sky, grass, leaf, night, 
blood, fire, flame, sun ) 
(Adj. ) + Noun BNC
yellow, red sun, fire, flame
1 sun, fire, flame  
 
1 ( (2016) ) 
sun  fire  flame  
         
13 GOLDEN 11 16 BLACK1 20 2 BLUE 26 
16 WHITE 10 28 BLUE 13 5 ORANGE 13 
24 YELLOW 7 31 RED 11 7 YELLOW 12 
26 RED 6 36 WHITE 9 10 RED 9 
 43 GREEN 7 20 GREEN 5 
 
Blue + fire/ flame ”Damian snatched the phone from her hand, eyes like blue 







N2 N1  
 
3.  
N1 N2  
white, black, red, blue, green, yellow 6 Corpus of Contemporary  
English (COCA) white, black, red, blue, green, yellow
N2 20 N2
5 N2
 “Their hearts were as evil and black as coal.” 
 
6 Biggam (2015) ModE 11 (white, black, red, yellow, green, gray, blue, 
brown, purple, orange, pink) 6 Biggam (2015) 
OE, ME, ModE  
 
 
1 BLACK ( 2016: 60)  
2 Richards (1936) tenor vehicle vehicle
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(2) OE : hwit, blæc/(sweart) , read, geolu, grene, græg 
ME : whit, blak, red, yelwe, grene, grei, bleu, brown 















N2 N1  
 
4.  
COCA 4.1 6 N2
4.2  
 
4.1 N2  
COCA  + as (e.g., white as) 5 white, 




( white SHEET 100 95 5 )
COCA  
N2 vehicle  
N2  
black (death, soul, hell, ace of spade, sin)  
N2 sky, sun, cloud  
N2
vehicle




3 N2 2-25: ace of spade, 4-8 : robin’s egg, 4-35: window cleaner, 4-37: gas flame,  
5-14: growing corn ,6-17: frog belly, 6-23: spun gold 






1   SNOW 112 1   NIGHT 94 1   BLOOD 52
2   SHEET 100 2   COAL 40 2   HAIR 16
3   GHOST 53 3   PITCH 24 3   FIRE 15
5   BONE 22 4   INK 20 4   BEET 14
6   PAPER 15 5   MIDNIGHT 18 5   ROSES 6
7   CHALK 18 6   HAIR 14 8   SUN 6
8   MILK 15 7   TAR 13 9   LOBSTER 7
9   MOON 13 8   DEATH 9 10   APPLE 6
10   LIGHT 2 9   EBONY 10 11   RUBIES 5
11   MARBLE 10 10   RAVEN 11 14 CHERRIES 5
12   HAIR 5 13   SOUL 7 15   CRIMSON 1
13   COTTON 7 14   HELL 8 16   FLAME 3
15   CLOUDS 7 15   EYES 4 17   TOMATO 5
17   CREAM 4 17   PIT 3 18   SUNSET 4
19   ICE 6 18   SKY 10 19   BEETROOT 4
21   MOONLIGHT 4 20   OBSIDIAN 9 21   DEVIL 3
22   LILY 4 21   SIN 9 22   LIPS 3
23   SUGAR 6 22   SACKCLOTH 1 23   WINE 4
24   ALABASTER 5 23   SOOT 8 26 MINE 4
25   PEARLS 5 25 ACE 7 27   HELL 3
1. white 2. black 3. red
 
 
1   SKY 47 1   GRASS 18 2   BUTTER 4
2   SEA 12 4   SEA 5 3   SUN 2
3 EYES 10 5   GLASS 5 5   CHEESE 2
6   ICE 8 6   EMERALDS 4 8   DAFFODIL 2
8   EGG 8 7   MOSS 4 9   BUTTERCUP 2
10   HEAVEN 7 8   APPLES 4 11   PARCHMENT 2
12 LAKE 4 9   OCEAN 3 12   MUSTARD 2
14   MEDITERRANEAN 4 10   LEAVES 4 13   WAX 2
18 ATLANTIC 3 11   GOURD 2 14   BANANA 2
20   OCEAN 3 12   SPRINGTIME 1 15   CHICK 2
25   FORGET-ME-NOTS 2 14   CORN 3 16   SUNSHINE 2
27   SAPPHIRES 2 15   WAVES 1 17   BELLY 1
29   PLUMS 2 MINE 2 18   GRASS 2
30   MARBLES 2 18   SHAMROCK 2 19   FLOWERS 1
33   LAGOON 2 20   LAWNS 2 22   LEAVES 1
35   CLEANER 2 21 DÉCOR 1 23   GOLD 1
36   INK 2 22   JADE 2 31   BIRDSEED 1
37   FLAME 2 23   MEADOW 2 34   CURDS 1
40 HERS 2 24   SPINACH 2 35   CANARIES 1
42   SHADOWS 2 28 FOREST 1 39   BUTTERSCOTCH 1
4. blue 5. green 6. yellow
2 
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Moon (2008) N2 (ibid. 9)






white as alabaster/ pearls/ cream white as sheet/ ghost/ marble 
black as ebony/ raven black as death 
red as cherries red as beet(root)/ lobster 
blue as sky/ heaven/ sea/ lake/ Mediterranean/ 
Atlantic/ ocean / lagoon 
blue as plums 
green as grass/ moss / meadow green as glass/ grass/ moss/ corn/ lawn 





White as marble   
10 9 N1
 
(3) The fever faded but left behind a child with eyes dark against a pale face and skin that no longer 
blushed with life but was white as marble. 
 
(3)
white as marble  “a 
heart of marble” 5  
 
White as alabaster  
COCA white as alabaster 5 N1 (4) N1
 
(4) Handsome, his blond hair neatly side-combed, his face fresh and confidant, his teeth as white as 
alabaster. 
 











Black as death 
9 3 Hamlet 
3 6 N1 ”hair”, ”a dog”, ” the sky”, “a tattoo”, 
“water”, “darkness in a tunnel” (5) N1 ”pistol”  
(5) " …you do what I say or I'll kill you..." I guess he was talking about the pistol. All I could tell you 
was that it was massive, squared-off, and black as death.  
 
(5) ” I'll kill you.”
death (5) black as death
 
 
Black as raven  
COCA 11 “raven’s feathers”, “raven’s wing(s)”, “raven’s sheen”
N2 N1 ”stylishly” “sensually”  “shining” 
 
(6) Nazi's hair, stylishly cut, was as black as a raven's feathers. She had a dimpled square chin and full 
lips, just like her handsome father, and her beautiful almond eyes … 
 
Red as lobster     
COCA 7 N1  
(7) Didn't I tell you you were getting too much sun? Look at you, you're red as a lobster. 
 




Red as cherries  
5 N1 1 2 (8) ”gorgeous”
”laugh”, “elite”  
(8) Their hair hung down in dark curls and their lips were red as cherries. They were the most gorgeous 





Blue as sea/ lake/ Mediterranean/ Atlantic/ ocean / lagoon  
blue sea, lake, Mediterranean, Atlantic, ocean, lagoon N2
28 N1 ”eyes” 20 N1
(9) N2 Mediterranean
 
(9) Rose, has anyone ever told you your eyes are as blue as the Mediterranean in summer? ... Or that 
your lips are as luscious as red raspberries in fall? 
 
Blue as sky/ heaven 
blue as sky/ heaven
 
(10) Asa's eyes were as blue as the sweet summer sky and often reflected the distant thoughts of the poet 
he tried to keep hidden. 
 




“blue as the sea and sky” COCA
( 2017:249)
sky-blue horizon-blue cerulean-blue azure-blue
(2017)  
 
Green as grass / moss/ meadow 
blue green as grass/ moss/ meadow  (11) 
green as grass  
(11) She had the most beautiful green eyes I'd ever seen. Green as spring grass.  
 
green as grass/ moss/ meadow ”spring”, “springtime”
(11) 8 
 
Green as grass/ moss/ corn/ lawn 
green “immature, raw, untrained, inexperienced.” (OED) green 
N1 N2
(12) green as 
moss  
(12) He's a buck private green as creek moss who just followed orders, factory-like,... 
 
Yellow as (various nouns) 
Yellow “Of a person, his or her eyes, complexion, etc.: of an 
unhealthy yellowish colour, typically as a result of old age or disease.” “lacking in courage; faint-hearted; 
cowardly.” (OED) (13)
 
(13) All my babies had jaundice,' and when I flipped back the covers, there was this baby 
as yellow as a banana from a liver infection. 
 
(14)  
(14) Rainey's a repeat deserter, yellow as butter.  
 
N1 banana, butter 




N1 N2 black , 
green  yellow
White as marble white
Black ( raven 9) black as raven 
”Green-eyed” eyes green as grass 
blue eyes blue as the sea 
/ N1 /
 
8 18 spring green 5 (  1998:79)  









(e.g., white as snow, brown as berry) cliché
N2
(e.g., good as gold, drunk as a skunk)

















(16) 3 tenor  
(16) Ragnar, a humble but content fisherman, hooks a fish with " scales like sapphires, 




(17) vehicle  
(17) A dainty wee lassie she was, in her homespun frock with the baby flush in her cheeks and her eyes 
as truly blue as the forget-me-nots peeping at her from the garden grass. 
 
  
N1 (18)  
(18) I'd made her some coffee the way she liked it: black as tar, , 
 
(18) N1 ”coffee” N2 tar























2021 1 An Analysis of 
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Introduction 
The view that knowledge is dependent on the senses is called empiricism. From there it isn’t very far to an 
empirical theory of meaning.1 In modern times, the view has had many advocates and has led to several related 
theories of meaning. Early in that century, advances in the understanding of formal languages began to influence 
what research focused on and the way such research was conducted. Married to the empiricist stance, this gave 
rise to logical empiricism or logical positivism. Logical positivists focused a lot on linguistic phenomena. 
Metaphor (often) takes a linguistic form. So we might expect positivists to have turned their attention to it. While 
no lengthy consideration of linguistic metaphor exists, they did, at times, treat it if only indirectly. Assuming the 
logical positivist's treatment of metaphor amounts to a positivist theory of metaphor, what kind of theory is it? 
One way to describe the positivists’ discussion of metaphor is to call it a non-cognitivist treatment of metaphor. 
Thus, a positivist theory of metaphor would be a non-cognitivist theory of metaphor. But what does this mean? 
In this paper, I hope to do two things: First, I aim to define several ways in which a theory of metaphor can be 
described as non-cognitivist. These definitions draw on positivist literature in the same way as non-cognitivist 
theories of ethics or aesthetics draw on positivist literature in grounding the sense in which they are seen as 
cognitivist or not cognitivist. Second, I thereby aim to classify the positivist theory of metaphor in terms of the 
definitions provided. It turns out there is only one clear sense in which the said theory of metaphor can be 
described as non-cognitivist, but several senses in which it cannot. The discussion leads to a positivist based 
contextualisation of metaphor that is flexible and not inconsistent with many contemporary claims made 
regarding the relationship between literal meaning and metaphor related phenomena. To end I make the following 
points. First, given the conclusions drawn, the positivist treatment of ethics is different to the positivist treatment 
of metaphor. Second, it is unclear whether definitions of the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction based on the 
historical progress of psychology through the 20th century undermine anything that has been said.  
To start, I say more about the kind of positivism that is going to be relevant to us. Next, I define the senses 
in which the theory might be thought of as cognitivist or non-cognitivist. There are three senses of the 
cognitivist/non-cognitivist distinction to introduce. Based on key positivist claims and interpretations, I argue 
that a positivist theory of metaphor is clearly non-cognitivist in only one of these senses. The most charitable 
interpretation is given to the kind of positivism in question and, therefore, when problems arise, where possible, 
an effort is made to resolve them. Ultimately, this leads to a contextualisation of the theory in question making 
it interpretable in a way that is not inconsistent with contemporary empirical findings. In a last section, I point 
out a difference between the non-cognitivist claims made for a positivistic theory of ethics and the non-cognitivist 
description of the positivist treatment of metaphor. I end by introducing a sense of the cognitive/distinction that 
is based on a historical treatment of psychology. I argue this does not undermine the argument made. None of 
this amounts to advocating the positivist position. Rather, it amounts to a clarification of one historical treatment 
of metaphor. 
 
Logical Positivism, Introduction 
Logical positivism is associated with verificationism. For logical positivists, sentences are either analytic or 
synthetic. The analytic/synthetic dichotomy divides sentences into two types and is referred by positivists like A 
                                               
1 Indeed, it appears, one can go from a classic empirical stance quite quickly to the kind of positivism considered here (see 
discussion in Blandford 1999). 
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J Ayer (1936) to Immanuel Kant (1781). According to Ayer, Kant did not succeeded in making the distinction 
clear. However, positivists like Ayer did adopt the distinction. Ayer writes: 
 
I think that we can preserve the logical import of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions, while avoiding the confusions which mar his actual account, if we say that a proposition is 
analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic 
when its validity is determined by the facts of experience (Ayer 1936, 42-43) 
 
Examples of the distinction are provided below: 
 
(1) A square is a shape that has four sides of equal length and four right-angles 
 
(2) It is raining outside  
 
The truth of an analytic sentence (or sentence that expresses an analytic proposition) can be established by 
attending to the meanings of the words alone. (1) is an example. The truth of a synthetic sentence (or sentence 
that expresses a synthetic proposition) cannot be established by attending to the meanings of the words alone. Its 
truth is established by attending to the empirical facts. (2) is an example. Though the distinction seems somewhat 
intuitive, the analytic-synthetic classification is rather difficult to pin down (Hempel 1965). Some have rejected 
it outright (Quine 1953, 1960). Though others have been more supportive of it (Grice and Strawson 1956). 
Positivists adopted it.  
For positivists the meaning of a sentence that is not analytic is associated with verification. One way to 
introduce the basic idea behind verification is as follows. A J Ayer writes that “[N]o statement which refers to a 
‘reality’ transcending the limits of sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance” (Ayer 1936, 5). 
This quite naturally leads to verificationism. For it means that any statement that is literally meaningful is a 
statement that does not refer to a reality that transcends sense-experience. Given that such a reality is naturally 
open to the senses, it is open to being verified by the senses. Thus, it follows that any literally meaningful 
statement is open to sensible verification. Perhaps, too, it is appealing to think that if a statement can be verified 
by the senses, it is literally significant. Now, this looks like a biconditional is taking form. This gives the kind of 
positivism in question a logical form and suggests a criterion of meaning. Formalised, this comes to be known 
as the verification principle.  
But we can note, problems have dogged this type of positivism. The most well-known of the complaints 
against positivism in this form is that the verification principle is self-refuting (Feuer 1951). Indeed, most 
criticisms centre upon the verification principle itself. For example, consider Carl Hempel (1965). Hempel 
introduced a version of the principle like this (the “observation sentences” in question are supposed to describe 
potentially observable phenomena or observable states of affairs): 
 
A sentence has empirical meaning if and only if it is not analytical and it follows logically from some 
finite and logically consistent class of observation sentences (Hempel 1965, 104) 
 
Hempel set about demolishing the principle. He argues the principle is too restrictive because it rules out 
sentences that include universal claims but, at the same time, too liberal because it rules in metaphysical 
statements of the kind positivists had hoped to eliminate. He claims attempts to revise the principle have fared 
no better. They seem to render any statement whatsoever meaningful (see also Church 1949). In response Hempel 
wonders whether it would not be better to start by connecting extralogical subsentential expressions to observable 
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phenomena. A sentence composed of such terms would be empirically meaningful. This, too, is rejected on the 
basis that an extensional way of defining dispositions can’t be found,2 and dispositional terms are essential to the 
scientific understanding of the world—which positivism advocates for.3 
Is there anything in favour of this form of positivism? Perhaps. It seems intuitively attractive.  Indeed, for the 
positivist, it is completely natural (Schlick 1932, 32). It is, also, said to be presupposed by the scientific method 
(Schlick 1932, 38). This should appeal to more contemporary students of metaphor. For example, consider 
conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). A clear sense in which CMT theorists are positivist is in their advocacy of 
the empirical method. In a sense, CMT theorists are more true to the empirical method than positivists. Positivists 
did not apply it to the understanding of literal meaning. CMT theorists do apply it to the study of metaphorical 
phenomena (Gibbs 2008). A second sense in which CMT theorists are empiricists is in making the sensible the 
ground of meaning. For positivists, it is the source of literal meaning. For CMT theorists, it is, in many cases, the 
source of metaphorical meaning.  For example, Kövecses says, “Our experiences with the physical world serve 
as a natural and logical foundation for the comprehension of more abstract domains (Kövecses 2010, 7). There 
are also suggestions that it is the basic source of basic metaphorical schema.4 Nevertheless, positivists and CMT 
theories differ in a major respect. Positivism, it is thought, leads to a non-cognitivist theory of metaphor. CMT 
is resolutely cognitivist (e.g. Knowles & Moon 2006, p. 69). And now we are led to ask, what is it for a theory 
of metaphor to be called “non-cognitive”? As said, I will introduce three senses and argue that only in one sense 
is the positivist treatment of metaphor not cognitivist. Further, I will argue that this does not put it at odds with 
some claims made by contemporary researchers against philosophical treatments of metaphor.  
 
Logical Positivism, Non-Cognitivism (1)  
Positivism of the kind in question is taken to lead to a non-cognitivist perspective on metaphor. Non-cognitivism 
is to be contrasted to cognitivism. What exactly are non-cognitivist and cognitivist theories of metaphor?  
In the most common view, non-cognitivism is a label applied to theories of metaphor that deny metaphorical 
meaning. Sentences or their utterances, it is said, do not have metaphorical meanings. Another way of putting 
                                               
2 Today, intensional definitions of dispositional terms is favoured. At the time, Hempel rejected this due underdeveloped nature of 
intensional approaches to meaning (Choi & Fara 2013). 
3 These are not the only problems with verificationism. For example, the verification principle tells us that some statements are 
meaningless, but they appear meaningful. For example, religious statements and even some scientific statements (see Woit 2007). 
Some have wondered whether prior to applying the verification principle to a sentence (or deciding whether or not it can be applied), 
the meaning of the sentence needs to be understood (c.f. Berlin 1938). A last problem to mention is the problem of compositionality. 
Consider the following set of sentences: 
 
 
(i) There are brown chocolate nibs on your plate 
(ii) There are no brown chocolate nibs on your plate  
 
Suppose a sentence has meaning iff all of its component expressions have meaning (e.g. morpheme, word, phrase, etc.) This is often 
called the “principle of compositionality.” Suppose one doesn’t know the meaning of the expression “nibs” (in bold above). Suppose, 
next, one examines one’s plate and finds nothing there. One has falsified (i) without knowing the meaning of (i). Indeed, one has 
falsified (i) without knowing what would make (i) true. A similar story can be told for (ii). Given the assumptions in question, one 
may verify the truth of (ii) without knowing the meaning of (ii), and that without knowing what would make (ii) false. A response 
might be this. If a sentence is open to verification by the senses, then it can be shown to be either true or false. If a sentence can be 
shown to be either true or false, the sentence is literally meaningful. Since in both cases above, the disjunction holds, the path from 
verification to literal meaning is secured. But, given the first supposition, this renders the principle of compositionality false. This 
is a problem for many philosophers of language and semanticists. 
4 For example, see Mark Johnson introducing a suggestion made by Chris Johnson (1997) re the acquisition of basic metaphorical 
structure, Chris Johnson’s theory suggests babies go through two pertinent stages. First, there is the “conflation” stage, followed by 
the “differentiation” stage. Babies, for example, held by their careers will experience affection and warmth. Affection and warmth 
are conflated. Later, the two are differentiated. At this stage, the application of temperature to affection becomes metaphorical. 
(Johnson 2017, 111). 
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this is to say non-cognitivist theory denies that there is propositional content over and above literal propositional 
content.  
To give an example, we can consider a well-known theory of metaphor. One of the oldest theories of metaphor 
is the comparison theory of metaphor. Metaphors are comparisons. One of the most notorious versions of this 
theory is the simile theory of meaning. One version of this theory is non-cognitivist. To understand it, consider 
the following sentence: 
 
(3) Richard is a lion 
 
The literal simile theory of meaning says that (3) is elliptical, which we may represent like so: 
 
(4) Richard is...a lion 
 
Filling in the ellipsis gives us the meaning of (3), which is: 
 
(5) Richard is like a lion 
 
The latter sentence is the literal meaning of (3). It is not the metaphorical meaning of (3), since (3) is just the 
elliptical version of (5). Assume for a moment that for any metaphor, such a reduction can be engineered (this is 
unlikely, see Tirrell 1991). On this assumption, there are no metaphorical meanings, there are only literal 
meanings. This, then, is a non-cognitivist theory of metaphor.  
In contrast, consider what we will refer to as a substitution theory of metaphor. It is cognitivist. In its simplest 
form, the meaning that (3) expresses, in the metaphorical context, is the following: 
 
(6) Richard is brave 
 
Another way of saying this is (6) paraphrases (3). It is not the literal paraphrase of (3). It is the metaphorical 
paraphrase of (3). It does not paraphrase the literal proposition expressed by (3). It paraphrases the metaphorical 
proposition expressed by (3). This is a cognitivist theory of metaphor.  
It is the contention that a positivist theory of metaphor is not of this type, but of the previous non-cognitivist 
type. For positivism only allows for literal propositional content. This first sense of cognitivism, I shall denote 
by adding a subscript character to the expressions in question, giving us a dichotomy: cognitivismM vs. non-
cognitivismM. The subscripted “M” highlights that we are talking about this kind of cognitivism (that type 
contingent on metaphorical meaning or propositionality). The literal simile theory of metaphor is non-
cognitivistM but the contrasted substitution theory is cognitivistM. Most importantly for us, the positivist theory 
of metaphor is non-cognitivistM.  
 
Logical Positivism, Non-Cognitivism (2) 
It has been said that a positivist theory of metaphor is non-cognitivist in the sense that it eschews metaphorical 
meanings or propositions. But there is another sense of non-cognitivism that a positivist theory of metaphor does 
not entail. This is explained below.   
For logical positivists, it is contended, only one sort of meaning matters. Hilary Putnam summarises like this: 
 
[A]ccording to the logical positivists, the ‘scientific method’ exhausts rationality itself, and testability 
by that method exhausts meaningfulness (‘The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification’), the 
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list or canon would determine what is and what is not a cognitively meaningful statement. Statements 
testable by the methods in this list (the methods of mathematics, logic and the empirical sciences) would 
count as meaningful; all other statements, the positivists maintained, are ‘pseudo-statements’, or 
disguised nonsense (Putnam 1982, p. 105).  
 
There are some things to highlight here. First, the type of meaning in question is linguistic. Second, positivists 
want to determine cognitive meaning. And since they are interested in linguistic meaning, they want to determine 
the cognitive meaning of a linguistic unit (above a sentence or statement). Third, empirical testability (or 
mathematical or logical methods) are individually sufficient for cognitive meaning. The joint negation of the 
three is sufficient for cognitive meaninglessness. The applicability of the methods in question establish when a 
sentence or its use has cognitive meaning or not. Last, then, putting the mathematical or logical methods to one 
side, it is empirical testability that is the measure of cognitive meaning or meaningfulness. Thus, we might say, 
if a sentence is empirically testable, then it has cognitive meaning, and thus the sentence has linguistic meaning.  
On the other hand, if the sentence is not empirically testable, it has no cognitive meaning, and, therefore, has no 
linguistic meaning, i.e. it is linguistic nonsense. Cognitive significance or meaning is equivalent to empirical 
testability (if not mathematical or logical verification). We have seen problems with this kind of principle above, 
but let us assume that in some sense it is correct.  
We, now, seem to have a problem. We have said that a non-cognitivist theory of metaphor denies 
metaphorical meaning. And, we have seen that the literal simile theory is one such theory as opposed to the 
substitution view. And, we have noted that the positivist view is supposed to lead to a non-cognitivist view of 
metaphor. But, if cognitive meaning is equivalent to empirical testing (when not open to mathematical and logical 
methods), no theory entails the non-cognitivist outcome. What’s worse, if denying metaphorical propositionality 
entails non-cognitivism, then the literal simile theory and the positivist theory lead to confusion. Let me explain.   
Consider the literal simile theory. It was said to be a non-cognitivist theory of metaphor. It was said to be a 
non-cognitivist theory of metaphor because there was said to be no metaphorical content over and above a 
sentence's literal content. So the sentence: 
 
(7) Richard is a lion 
 
in its non-elliptical form is: 
 
(8) Richard is like a lion 
 
If, as far as the sentence in question is concerned, cognitive meaning is equivalent to empirical testability, then 
(7) has cognitive meaning. For any sentence, M, of the form: 
 
(9) X is Y 
 
if equivalent to: 
 
(10) X is like Y 
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where both X and Y terms refer to empirical phenomena, M is cognitively significant. Thus, literal simile theory 
cannot entail non-cognitivism.5  
The same goes for a positivist theory of metaphor. The senses can verify the truth of (7). If, then, the literal 
simile theory and the positivist way of treating (7) are non-cognitivist because they do not allow for nonliteral 
propositions, but cognitivist because (7) can be empirically tested, both views lead to contradiction. Our concern 
is the positivist theory.  
It seems the fault lies with confusing two different ideas of non-cognitivism. The first notion has it that if a 
theory of metaphor denies a sentence like (7) metaphorical meaning, then the theory of metaphor is non-
cognitivist. The second notion has it that a sentence like (7) is cognitively meaningless iff it lacks empirical 
testability (ignoring one of the other types). We must reject one of these senses of non-cognitivism or accept both 
as two different and distinct senses of non-cognitivism.  
Adopting this latter course, leads to a set of divisions explicable in the following way. The first sense of non-
cognitivism denies metaphorical meaning to a typical sentence. Any theory that denies metaphorical meaning to 
sentences like (7) is a non-cognitivist theory. The second sense of non-cognitivism denies literal meaning to a 
typical sentence on condition it is not empirically testable (nor susceptible to mathematical or logical methods).  
A theory that denies literal meaning to sentences in that way also divides cognitively significant from non-
cognitively significant sentences. And only if the theory denies literal meaning to all sentences like (7) is it non-
cognitivist in this sense. Thus, a positivist theory may be non-cognitivist in the first sense, but not in the second 
sense, since it (a) rules out metaphorical meaning; but (b) allows for sentences like (7) to have cognitive 
significance or be cognitively meaningful.  
Other theorists have charted a similar course. However, they have done so in order to take up a position that 
is contrary to positivism. For example, for John Searle (1979) a sentence may be literally meaningless but its 
utterance metaphorically meaningful. Writing on literal meaning, Searle says: 
 
A  sentence  may  have  more  than  one  literal  meaning  (ambiguity)  or  its  literal  meaning  may  be 
defective  or  uninterpretable  (nonsense)  (Searle,  1979b, 117).   
 
Writing on metaphor, he tells us this: 
 
Even  when  we  discuss  how  a  nonsense  sentence,  such  as  Chomsky’s [1957] example,  
“Colourless green  ideas  sleep  furiously”,  could  be  given  a  metaphorical  interpretation,  what  we  
are  talking about  is  how  the  speaker  could  utter  the  sentence  and  mean  something  by  it  
metaphorically, even  though  it is  literally  nonsensical (Searle,  1979a, 77).   
 
Of course, Searle is telling us a different story to the one that the positivist wants to tell us. But there is an 
important point here. Meaning can be divided between literal propositionality and metaphorical propositionality. 
For Searle, sentences may have or lack the former whilst their utterances possess or lack the latter. For the 
positivist, the metaphorical set is just empty.  
Drawing directly on positivist writing, there is reason to think metaphorical sentences are to be treated in the 
manner discussed; some are cognitively significant (in the literal sense), entailing a positivist theory of metaphor 
which is not fully or automatically non-cognitivist (in the literal sense). Consider these remarks from A J Ayer’s 
Language, Truth, and Logic:   
 
                                               
5 Indeed, in most cases, if not all, the sentences in question will be literally true since everything is like everything else in some 
respect (Davidson 1978). 
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In the vast majority of cases the sentences which are produced by poets do have literal meaning… [T]o 
say that many literary works are largely composed of falsehoods, is not to say that they are composed of 
pseudo-propositions….If the author writes nonsense, it is because he considers it most suitable for 
bringing about the effects for which his writing is designed (Ayer 1936, 14) 
 
We can suppose that the poets that Ayer has in mind use metaphor and some of the sentences that Ayer is referring 
to are sentences that are metaphorical. Supposing too that literal significance and cognitive significance are 
synonymous, Ayer’s comments then suggest that not all sentences used metaphorically imply nonsense. Which 
ones? The obvious answer is those that are literally false, for example, (7). But, moreover, there are sentences 
that are literally true that are used to bring about the effects that an author is taking aim at. For example, 
 
(11) The man is an ape6  
 
used to insult the man.  
There are reasons, then, to divide between two senses of cognitivism. The first sense, I have said, I shall 
denote by adding a subscript: cognitivistM vs. non-cognitivistM. The second sense, I shall denote by adding a 
subscript: cognitivistL vs. non-cognitivistL. The subscripts denote the kind of meaning that is denied to a sentence. 
The former denies metaphorical propositionality or meaning. The latter, literal propositionality or meaning. There 
are reasons to think a further sense of cognitivism is called for. 
 
Logical Positivism, Non-Cognitivism (3) 
Thus far, two kinds of non-cognitivism have been identified. There is the type that denies that there are 
metaphorical propositions. There is the type that denies that there are literal propositions (based on the lack of 
empirical or formal verification methods). Sentences that are metaphorical, it seems, are non-cognitivist in the 
first sense. But they need not be non-cognitivist in the second sense ((7) and (11) give us examples of this).   
There are positivists who seem to demand a harder line. Consider Rudolf Carnap (1935). He says,  
 
The aim of a lyrical poem in which occur the words “sunshine” and “clouds” is not to inform us of 
certain meteorological facts, but to express feelings of the poet and to excite similar feelings in us. A 
lyrical poem has no assertive sense, nor theoretical sense, it does not contain knowledge (Carnap 1935, 
29) 
 
I will assume complete sentences that appear in lyrical poems can be thought of as metaphorical. For example,  
 
(12) A little cloud stood lonely  (Ruby Archer) 
 
This is a sentence that appears in a poem and one that we might call metaphorical. Clouds do not stand and clouds 
do not feel lonely. According to Carnap, then, the aim of this lyric is not to inform us of anything, but, rather, to 
                                               
6 It is difficult to see how CMT theorists can explain this kind of metaphor. CMT holds that a linguistic metaphor, for example, a 
is b is an exemplar of a deeper cognitive relation A IS B (capitalisation signifying that it is concepts we are discussing). A is called 
the target. B is called the source. Elements of A are understood through elements of B, exemplified by the linguistic metaphor a is 
b. Elements of A belong to one conceptual domain. Elements of B belong to another conceptual domain. Target domain and source 
domain are alien to each other. In most cases, something less concrete is understood in terms that apply to something more concrete, 
where what is most concrete is something that is sensible and found in one’s environment. But, in the case cited, what is the 
conceptual metaphor? Perhaps, the conceptual metaphor is HUMANS ARE ANIMALS. The target domain is neither alien to the 
source domain nor more abstract.  
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express, incite, and excite. What Carnap means to say, with respect to our sentence, is that the sentence is not 
used to inform us about anything.7 Rather, it is used to express the feelings of the author and excite those same 
feelings in the audience. This draws out a distinction, between two different kinds of functionality (and related 
effect), which for the time being we will refer to as simply “cognitive” and “non-cognitive.”  
In terms of the effects that Ayer has mentioned above, cognitive effect may be distinguished from a non-
cognitive effect in the following sense. Cognitive effects are related to shifts in thoughts and beliefs. This suggests 
they are likely propositional. Non-cognitive effects are related to shifts in attitudes, emotions, feelings, moods, 
and motivations. They are non-propositional in this sense.  
But, also, we are not only talking about cognitive and non-cognitive functionality and effect, but meaning. 
That is, cognitive and non-cognitive meaning. Whilst attacking metaphysical statements, Carnap says this: 
 
Today we distinguish various kinds of meaning, in particular cognitive (designative, referential) meaning 
on the one hand, and non-cognitive (expressive) meaning components, e.g. emotive and motivative, on 
the other. In the present paper, the word "meaning" is always understood in the sense of "cognitive 
meaning." The thesis that the sentences of metaphysics are meaningless, is thus to be understood in the 
sense that they have no cognitive meaning, no assertive content. The obvious psychological fact that 
they have expressive meaning is thereby not denied; this is explicitly stated in Section 7 (Carnap 1931, 
80-81, my italics).  
 
Carnap, then, accepts distinct kinds of meaning. There is cognitive meaning, associated with a designative, 
referential function. There is expressive meaning, which is associated with emotive and motivative functions. 
This is an “obvious psychology fact”—at least, one that Carnap can agree with. So far as the sentences of 
metaphysics are concerned, they do not have a cognitive meaning, though they may have expressive meaning. 
For Carnap, the lyrical verse associated above with the poets have an affinity to metaphysical statements.  
 
Metaphysical [statements]—like lyrical verses—have only an expressive function, but no representative 
function. Metaphysical statements are neither true nor false, because they assert nothing, they contain 
neither knowledge nor error, they lie completely outside the field of knowledge, of theory, outside the 
discussion of truth or falsehood. But they are, like laughing, lyrics, and music, expressive. (Carnap 1935, 
29) 
 
Assuming again that lyrical verse incorporates metaphor, given the passage, we may conclude: metaphor only 
has an expressive function; does not have a representative function; is not true, nor false; asserts nothing; contains 
no knowledge; contains no error; has no relation to knowledge, no relation to theory; is expressive; and is rather 
like laughing, crying, and music. To sum up, the sentences in question have an expressive function, but lack a 
cognitive function. But just as important, given the previous passage, the verses or sentences in question can be 
thought to be significant in the non-cognitive sense even if they lack cognitive significance. 
There is, then, significance and functionality (and effect) to incorporate into the positivist picture. Along the 
significance dimension, we have cognitive and expressive significance, which we can read as two distinct types 
of meaning. The one is cognitive meaning. The other, which we have seen Carnap endorse, is “expressive 
meaning.” This we have referred to as non-cognitive meaning. Along the functionality dimension, we have 
cognitive functionality and expressive, or non-cognitive, functionality. The poet who uses expressions like “cloud” 
and “sunshine” to say nothing about the weather, is not using the expressions in question cognitively, but 
expressively. The effect of these sentences is on the non-cognitive centres of the mind.   
                                               
7 Lyric verses or sentences do not have aims. 
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Perhaps, the positivist that speaks most clearly to this end is the meta-ethicist C L Stevenson. Stevenson has 
the view that there are two kinds of meaning that matter: descriptive and emotive. Stevenson also identifies two 
kinds of use (function and associated effect, in the vocabulary above). There are descriptive uses and dynamic 
uses. Let’s think about meaning first.  
Descriptive meaning is invariant with respect to individual psychology and context, and, at the level of the 
sentence, it is propositional (Stevenson 1937). Emotive meaning is referred, by Stevenson (1937), to Ogden and 
Richards (1923). Basically, emotive meaning is symbolically vacuous (Ogden and Richards 1923, 125) or non-
referential. We may suppose this to mean that it is semantically or linguistically vacuous. According to Ogden 
and Richards, the archetype is the expression “good.” It is, they suggest, somewhat polysemic. But in its ethical 
constituency, it is wholly emotive. So consider the following set of sentences: 
 
(13) This is red 
 
(14) This is good (said in an ethical context) 
 
For Ogden and Richards, the predicate in (13) is symbolically significant. But the predicate in (14) is not. If we 
suppose this to mean that the predicate in (14) is semantically vacuous, we can see how it might render the 
sentence in question meaningless. Following a Fregean line of thought, today, many prominent systems of 
semantic representation take predicates to denote functions (e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998). But if the predicate in 
(14) is semantically vacuous, then it denotes nothing and (14), itself, is classified as undefined. That is, it, too, 
lacks a denotative sense. In other words the sentence is semantically meaningless. This rings true for the positivist. 
Rather, the expression is associated with a somewhat persistent tendency to reflect and produce non-cognitive 
responses in the speaker-hearer (Stevenson 1937, 23). As said, the archetype is the expression “good.” Stevenson 
builds a whole meta-ethical positivist theory based on this line of reasoning. In any case, what is important here 
is the idea that an expression like (the ethical) “good” can lack semantic value, yet be said to possess a meaning 
where such meaning is just the tendency to reflect and effect non-cognitive responses in the respective speaker 
and hearer.  
What of functionality? Non-dynamic descriptive uses track descriptive meanings. The use of a sentence, for 
example, to ascribe a light-reflecting object a colour, is descriptive. Dynamic use aims for emotive effect. We 
might say, adopting the language above, non-dynamic uses have a cognitive function and aim for cognitive effects. 
Dynamic uses have non-cognitive functions and aim for non-cognitive effects. Importantly, Stevenson suggests 
that meaning and use are not equivalent. Emotive meaning does not demand a dynamic use since an expression 
can possess the tendency in question even if it is not used dynamically. In turn, we can envisage circumstances 
in which an expression is used dynamically, but lacks the tendency to reflect and produce non-cognitive effects. 
Though such an effect may emerge contextually. For example, it is not too difficult to see how a sentence that is 
true can be used non-cognitively (see (11) above and (15) below). Stevenson is very sensitive to the contextual 
nature of use and the shifts in function and effect that this produces. This is one reason he eschews any reduction 
of meaning to use (Stevenson 1937, 22).  
Having denied the equivalence between emotive meaning and dynamic use, or non-cognitive meaning and 
non-cognitive functionality-effect, we note that Stevenson does stress that emotive meaning is well-suited to 
reflecting and producing non-cognitive results (Stevenson 1937, 23). In fact, it can be so well-suited that a non-
cognitive function-effect can be hard to suppress. Stevenson’s example is somewhat dated (if interested see 
Stevenson 1937, 23). Likewise, we can see how an expression is so well-suited to describing the facts that it is 
difficult to see how it might take on a non-cognitive function-effect.  
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We are talking about cognitive significance and cognitive functionality, on the one hand; and, non-cognitive 
significance and functionality, on the other. We can draw on psychological definitions to reframe what we are 
calling non-cognitive significance and functionality. To do this, I draw upon contemporary definitions provided 
by the American Psychological Association: 
 
● Cognition: All forms of knowing and awareness, such as perceiving, conceiving, remembering, 
reasoning, judging, imagining, and problem solving (APA Dictionary, 2020). 
 
● Affect: Any experience of feeling or emotion, ranging from suffering to elation, from the simplest to the 
most complex sensations of feeling, and from the most normal to the most pathological emotional 
reactions...both mood and emotion are considered affective states (APA Dictionary, 2020). 
 
● Conation: The proactive (as opposed to habitual) part of motivation that connects knowledge, affect, 
drives, desires, and instinct to behaviours (APA Dictionary, 2020). 
 
We may use these definitions to make sense of what the positivists are saying. Poetical sentences and lyrics, 
following Ayer, may have cognitive significance. Following Carnap, they do not have cognitive function, which 
we now take to mean they do not produce a cognitive effect. Rather, they have affective-conative functionality 
and effect. That is, they act on the affective-conative centres of the mind—expressing and inspiring emotion and 
motivating behaviours or connecting affect to cognition. This runs parallel to Stevenson. The descriptive 
meanings he talks of are cognitive. The emotive meanings affective-conative defined by tendencies to produce 
affective-conative effects. Likewise, the non-dynamic uses, we can think of as cognitive uses associated with 
cognitive functions and effects; the dynamic uses, we associate with affective-conative functions and effects. But, 
now, this is very important for the development of our understanding. For if the sentences that we are considering 
do not directly connect to the cognitive centres of the mind, they may indirectly do so. Why? Simply enough 
because they have conative functionality-effect, and, as defined, conation can connect affect to cognition. This 
is evidentially true when we consider a word like the ethical “good.” The positivists believe it is cognitively 
insignificant. This is a belief. Evidentially, therefore, there is a route from its dynamic meaning and force to a 
cognitive effect (e.g. the belief).   
The positivists, then, allow for linguistic uses that lead to different psychological outcomes. There are 
cognitive effects, on the one hand, and non-cognitive affective-conative effects, on the other. These may be 
defined as we have defined them above, psychologically. One aspect of the functionality-effect in question (the 
conative) may connect circuitously to the cognitive. 
But, now, it seems there may be three senses in which a theory of metaphor may be called non-cognitivist: 
metaphorical, literal, psychological. In the first sense, the theory denies that metaphorical sentences or utterances 
have metaphorical meaning. In the second sense, the theory denies that metaphorical sentences or utterances have 
literal meaning. In the last sense, the theory denies that metaphorical sentences or utterances have cognitive 
functions-effects. The positivist is clearly non-cognitivist in the first sense; there are no metaphorical meanings-
-no nonliteral propositionality. The positivist is not non-cognitivist in the second sense to the extent positivism 
does not entail denying literal meaning to sentences that are used metaphorically. Though, such sentences, in the 
metaphorical context, for example, that of a poem, may not be used with a cognitive function-effect in mind. The 
positivist is not non-cognitivist in the last sense. A sentence may, lacking emotive sense in ordinary contexts, 
register cognitively, even when used in Stevenson’s more dynamic sense. (11) is an example. In another sense, 
the most important sense, if a sentence is used with a non-cognitive function-effect in mind and it succeeds in 
realising its affective-conative function, it may trigger a cognitive response given the connective nature of the 
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conative faculty whether or not it has cognitive significance in any other sense. It is, that is, cognitively significant 
circuitously.  
Let us add, then, a further sense of the cognitive/non-cognitive division to our list. First, we talked of a 
cognitiveM/non-cognitiveM divide. Next, we introduced a cognitiveL/non-cognitiveL duality. We may, given the 
discussion above, introduce a third, the cognitiveP vs non-cognitiveP distinction. Here the subscript emphasises 
the psychological underpinnings. Given this, it is being argued that a positivist theory of metaphor is non-
cognitiveM, but nothing entails that it is non-cognitiveL or that it is non-cognitiveP. Yet, there is a lingering issue. 
We seem to have ignored Carnap’s claim that lyric verse, and, thus, metaphor is to be thought of as cognitively 
insignificant. In which sense does he mean? 
 
Logical Positivism, CognitiveL, Sous Rature  
The positivist wishes to eject metaphysical sentences from scientific discourse. This is because they are not 
cognitively significant. Carnap thinks lyrical verses are like metaphysical sentences. They, too, lack cognitive 
significance. Assuming lyrical verse includes metaphor, we can conclude metaphor lacks cognitive significance. 
But I have just argued that metaphor does not lack cognitiveL significance in many cases, and that so far as it has 
affective-conative meaning it may not lack cognitiveP significance. But Carnap cannot just be saying metaphor 
lacks cognitiveM significance. So, ultimately, there is a claim attributable to Carnap to explain, lyrical verse and, 
therefore, metaphor is cognitively insignificant. If that means it is not cognitivelyL significant, his claim looks 
like it is inconsistent with the conclusions drawn. (We can accept that the kind of sentence in question is not 
directly cognitivelyP significant, but circuitously so.) Since the conclusions are based on positivist writings and 
scientific assumptions, this puts Carnap and odds with his own project. I have said, I want to present the positivist 
in the best possible light. If we want to pursue that charitable line, we must find some way to make Carnap’s 
claims consistent with the conclusions that we have drawn. Is there a way to do this? I think so. The apparent 
inconsistency is not a knockout blow at all.  
One way to establish consistency is to adopt the following position. The basic idea is that a sentence such as 
 
(15) It is raining 
 
is disposed to have a certain cognitiveL significance (factoring for ambiguity or polysemy) in a context of use 
given certain contextual factors (pertaining to the use of literality), but that such significance can be erased by 
certain other contextual factors. Recall, Carnap says that when expressions like “cloud” and “sunshine” do not 
aim to inform us about the meteorological facts, they lack cognitive significance. I will now suppose that Carnap 
means that when they are not used or do not function to inform us about the meteorological facts, they lack 
cognitiveL significance. 8  We can then suppose that some of the contextual factors that erase cognitiveL 
significance are related to use or function. For the positivist it needn’t follow that there is any other meaning that 
replaces the erased meaning. In this sense, we think of the sentence as meaningless. But not entirely. We can still 
speak of affective-conative meanings associated with tendencies to produce certain affective and conative effects, 
and we might even think certain secondary cognitiveP effects. Though, in novel cases such tendencies may not 
exist with. They may need to be nurtured. In any case, this will make sense of Carnap’s claim that sentences, 
here (15), are cognitively insignificant (in this case when not used to speak of the weather—that might be the 
case in a situation where money is being distributed, bad news is being heard, etc.). It is consistent with our claim 
that (15) does have a cognitiveL significance, too. That is, when it is considered without reference to contextual 
factors of the kind that render it as a sentence that does not speak to the meteorological facts.  
                                               
8 Linguistic expressions do not have aims. 
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In addition, to provide the positivist the opportunity to develop the most expansive theory of metaphor, 
contextual factors that erase cognitiveL significance can be thought of in two ways: 
 
(a) as erasing the cognitiveL significance of the sentence as a whole, or  
 
(b) as erasing the cognitiveL significance of the sentence’s cognitiveL significant components either in part 
or as a whole. 
 
First, following the positivists in question, a sentence is cognitivelyL significant or it is not. The positivists in 
question are engaged in providing criteria that distinguish meaningful sentences from nonsense—not degrees or 
shades of such meaningfulness.  
Second, it is sometimes sensible to think that the cognitiveL significance of expressions associated with the 
nonliteral use of a sentence matters in part to the metaphorical effect. There are a number of theorists who argue 
that literal meaning is essential to metaphor (non-cognitivists and cognitivists alike (see Magidor 2015)). 
Positivism, as presented, needn’t wholly reject this, even if in the relevant contexts the cognitiveL significance of 
the sentence is erased. For example, consider: 
 
(16) Biden is square 
 
Since the sentence is not being used to talk about actual shapes, the cognitiveL significance of the sentence is 
erased. Still, the expression “Biden” has cognitiveL significance here. It is being used to talk about the President 
of the United States. Even in sentences where every expression is metaphorical, the cognitiveL significance of 
each expression may figure in producing secondary cognitiveP effects. Sentences whose expressions have 
cognitiveL significance wholly erased—insofar as they do not function to talk about the facts they are ordinarily 
used to talk about—may be aimed at producing secondary cognitive effects—cognitiveP significance—through 
attention to their erased content, rather than anything else. Such sentences exist. This sentence is borrowed from 
Searle (1978b):  
 
(17) The bad news congealed into a block of ice 
 
Following Carnap, neither the noun phrase nor the verb phrase (nor its contained noun phrase) are used to refer 
to things that they usually refer to, and, thus, are not cognitivelyL significant—or, in the terms, I am advocating, 
they have had their literal significance erased.  
    At the same time, focusing on the erased cognitiveL significance may not be possible or even interfere with 
the related effects. I have associated metaphorical effect with affective-conative effects and secondary cognitiveP 
effects. We might suppose that literal meanings need not figure in producing any affective effects. We might also 
suppose that literal meanings need not figure in producing any conative effects; not even in producing any 
secondary cognitiveP effects. For example, when a sentence contains no cognitivelyL significant expressions. 
That is, for example, a sentence in which every expression is not used to talk about what it is factually used to 
refer to. (Again, (17) might be such a sentence).  
There is some evidence that suggests that focusing hearers-readers on the literal meaning of a non-literal use 
interferes with the cognitive processing of that non-literal use. Glucksberg (2008) presents the following 
experimental outline. Consider four sentences:  
 
(18) Lawyers are sharks  
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(19) Apples taste good 
(20) Lawyers are married 
(21) Sharks are good swimmers  
 
The first sentence is taken to be metaphorical. The interpretation is that it has a topic, lawyers, and a vehicle, 
sharks. On this account, the topic is understood through the vehicle through a shared ground. Three experimental 
scenarios follow: 
 
1. Subjects are given sentences that focus on the topic (20) and asked to interpret (18) 
2. Subjects are given sentences that focus on the vehicle (21) and asked to interpret (18) 
3. Subjects are given sentences that focus on neither topic nor vehicle (19) and asked to interpret (18) 
 
The second scenario slowed down processing time. It is interpreted that this shows that literal meaning 
interfered with processing or interpreting nonliteral meaning. 9  If the conclusion is true, our positivist might 
interpret the experiment as showing cognitiveL significance interferes with secondary cognitiveP effects in 
contexts in which the erasure of cognitiveL significance is obvious—that is, following Carnap, where “shark” is 
not being used to talk about the biological category. The conclusion might also be hypothesised of sentences like 
(17). On the other hand, as said, even though wholly erased, the cognitiveL significance of one or more 
expressions might matter.  
At this point, I think, it is also useful to add that we may think of the erasure of cognitiveL significance, related 
affective-conative functions-effects, and secondary cognitiveP effects as automatic. For example, in the last 
scenario, it seems that the erasure of cognitiveL significance, the affective-conative function-effect, and the 
secondary cognitiveP effects are somewhat automatic—that is, prior to registering the cognitiveL significance of 
the sentence in question. We can just see this as the tendency for certain affective-conative tendencies (and related 
secondary cognitiveP effects) to follow immediately in processing the sentence. That may be why the presence 
of cognitiveL significance interferes with processing the sentence in question. 10 Insults, slurs, and category 
mistakes might attest to this. This is not antithetical to positivism which, as we have seen considering Stevenson, 
quite willingly takes up the view that nonliteral significance may take priority over literal significance. It is not 
a hard stretch to think that such significance can have an automatic cognitiveP significance. One can still deny it 
cognitiveL significance. One can still deny it cognitiveM significance. This needn’t contradict the claim that 
                                               
9 A quick comment about the experiment in question. Consider the following syllogism. A: 
 
1. Sharks swim. 
2. My lawyer is a shark. 
3. My lawyer is a predator. 
 
Now compare it to the following syllogism, B: 
 
1. Sharks are predators. 
2. My lawyer is a shark. 
3. My lawyer is a predator. 
 
Syllogism A is not valid. Syllogism B is valid. A1 is a sentence that subjects are given before being asked to process the metaphor 
A2/B2. A3/B3 is the result of processing the A2/B2. Suppose that metaphor processing is a syllogistic or inferential process. If this 
were the case, then it would be no surprise that A1 interferes with the process. An alternative to A1 might be B1. Given our 
assumption, we would also expect that B1 would not interfere with the process. Indeed, we might suspect that it would expedite the 
process. If this were the case, since B1 is no less literal than A1, we could not conclude that literal meaning interferes with the 
processing of metaphor. Though, we might conclude that obscuring the vehicle-ground relationship does.  
10 However, see the previous note. 
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cognitiveP significance is circuitous if we have a “career of metaphor” story to tell about the development of the 
automatic tendency. In other words, automatic cognitiveP significance may be instilled and sustained over time 
(as a tendency or disposition).  
Contextualisation is not alien to the positivist approach. Carnap’s words suggest contextualisation. Carl 
Hempel (1965), belonging to a second wave of positivists, seems to see contextualisation as a natural outcome 
of theory building the positivist way. And Hempel himself emphasised that practical aspects shape cognitive 
significance within the context of a theory and its application. Theories are cognitively significant. Theoretical 
statements are cognitively significant to the extent the theory is cognitively significant. Arbiters of theoretical 
significance are clarity and precision of formulation, explanatory and predictive power with respect to observable 
phenomena, simplicity, and confirming evidence (Hempel 1965, 117). This seems to lead to the rejection of 
metaphor from scientific theory for theories containing metaphor are not as cognitively significant as those 
without. But this is not a proposition put forward here. Hempel is not the kind of positivist we have in mind.  
 
Last Comments 
In this brief last section, I wish to highlight two things. First, the positivist treatment of ethical statements and 
the positivist treatment of metaphor is to be distinguished. Second, it is unclear whether a historical classification 
of psychology into cognitivist/non-cognitivist groups undermines the conclusions drawn. 
First, a positivistic treatment of sentences said to express ethical truths denies that they express ethical 
propositions. But other theories assert that they express ethical propositions. We can draw a distinction. A theory 
is a non-cognitivistE theory if it denies there are ethical propositions. A theory is non-cognitiveE if it asserts there 
are ethical propositions. The positivist treatment of sentences thought to express ethical statements is non-
cognitiveE. This is just like the positivist treatment of sentences that express metaphors. In parallel, it is non-
cognitiveM. Moreover, a positivistic treatment of sentences said to express ethical truths denies that they express 
literal propositions. Let’s suppose that a non-positivist treatment of sentences that are said to express ethical 
truths do not deny that they also express literal truths. The first theory is a non-cognitivistL theory with respect 
to ethics. The second theory is a cognitivistL theory with respect to ethics. The positivist theory is a non-
cognitivistL theory. This is different from the positivist treatments of sentences that are metaphorical. That 
treatment does not entail that they lack literal meaning (only that it can be erased if it is present). Therefore, it is 
not a non-cognitivistL theory in the sense defined. In the third sense, of cognitivism defined above, we can take 
both theories are primarily non-cognitivistP but circuitously cognitivist P in that each theory does not rule out 
psychological functions and effects and it is possible to think such psychological functions and effects engender 
non-cognitivistP effects. 
A last sense of the cognitivism/non-cognitivism distinction may be grounded in a distinction drawn from the 
historical development of psychology. At the turn of the century, psychology was marked by a turn to 
behaviourism. John B Watson (1913) argued that psychology should not study private, subjective, or qualitative 
events. Rather, psychology should study public, objective, quantitative events. This amounted to studying 
behaviour, physiological processes, the effects of conditioning, and stimulus-response events, all of which could 
be produced under experimental conditions. A second wave of behaviourists developed soon after. This school 
is better known as “neobehaviourist.” Three names stand out here: Edward C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull, and B. F. 
Skinner. In general, neobehaviourists emphasized theory construction grounded on the empirical observation of 
behaviour. Unlike Watson, however, many neobehaviourists did allow for psychological explanations that 
included appeals to conscious events, mental processes, and unobservables (theoretical constructs). Cognitivism 
comes next. Cognitivists indirectly inferred unseen mental processes. Cognitivists thought that stimulus-response 
relations were much more mediated and complex than the neobehaviourists. Later cognitivists, under the 
influence of philosophers like Hilary Putnam (1967), came to view the mind as an information processing unit. 
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This gives rise to the multidisciplinary research field of the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is to be strongly 
contrasted to J. B. Watson style behaviourism. Watson does not seem to allow for any type of inferred reality 
beyond what is given outwardly in behaviour. We may, thus, call Watson a non-cognitivist. But, also, following 
the history charted, we might want to call any stage prior to the cognitivist school non-cognitivist. Then, if the 
positivist treatment of metaphor entails one of these non-cognitivist schools of thought, we can call it non-
cognitivist (in this historical sense). Sigmund Koch (1964) has suggested positivism has a very close relation to 
neobehaviourism and, indeed, neobehaviourists themselves stressed this. However, things are not this simple. 
For neobehaviourist do seem to allow for some psychological outcomes that appear cognitivist and sometimes 
neobehaviourists took these outcomes as being positivist. A brief introduction to the neobehaviourists introduced 
above will suffice to show this. 
A brief introduction to the neobehaviourists introduced above will suffice to show this. Tolman and Hoznik 
(1930) developed the idea of latent learning, learning that is not dependent on reinforcement. In consequence of 
this, Tolman (1948) developed the idea of a “cognitive map.” These were representations or internal images. 
Keep in mind, this was at a time after Tolman had come under the influence of the positivists. Indeed, Tolman 
thought he was doing for psychology what the logical positivists had done for physics (Tolman 1935). Hull was 
one of the strongest advocates of the positivists. On a number of occasions, he explicitly talked of the close 
relation between his work and the logical positivism (e.g. Hull 1938, 1943a). At the same time, Hull that 
“intervening variables” were inferred from observable behaviour. They were, themselves, unobservable. They 
were, according to Hull, somewhat like “electrons, protons, positrons, etc.” (Hull 1943b, 21). Hull is no Cartesian 
and Hull is not positing anything like an entelechy, which he is at pains to demonstrate (Hull 1943b, 23). He 
seems to be introducing a functional theoretical construct, which is indirectly verified. It is difficult not to think 
of the construct as cognitive. And, yet, Hull seems to think he is working in parallel to Carnap when talking about 
these variables (Hull 1943a,). B. F. Skinner is associated with the label radical behaviourism. Whilst accepting 
the existence of mental events, he argued environmental effects (including evolutionary effects) were the most 
important factor in explaining behaviour. And that, ultimately, behaviour would be given a physiological 
explanation relating behaviour to environmental factors with respect the species as a whole and the individual in 
question (Skinner 1974). More pertinently, he rejected the claim that behaviourism does not try to explain 
cognitive processes (Skinner 1974). Though, at the same time, he also rejected the kind of psychology that 
explains behaviour by appealing to, in his words, the conceptual nervous system of mathematical models (Skinner 
1974). Yet, others have found elements of cognitivism in Skinner (Delprato and Midgley, 1992, 1517). It might 
also be pointed out, unlike Tolman and Hull. Skinner didn’t say he was carrying out the logical positivist project.  
In any case, at this point, we can draw the following conclusion. If the positivist theory of metaphor entails 
neobehaviourism in one of its guises, we cannot simply conclude that the theory entails non-cognitivist thought. 
The positivist theory needs to do more than that. It needs to entail not just the aforementioned schools of 
psychology, it needs to entail them in a form that rules out the cognitivist elements associated with these forms. 
For example, it needs to rule out Tolman’s cognitive maps, or Hull’s “intervening variables.” This might better 
demonstrate that there is a historical sense in which the positivist theory is antithetical to the cognitivist 
school. But there is a lot more to say here. For positivists, themselves, talked of psychology (e.g. Carnap 1959) 
and it is not clear that they were committed to any one school. Wilson (2003), for example, connects positivism 
to Freud. To connect the positivists and, thereby, the positivist theory of metaphor to behaviourism in order to 
deem it non-cognitivist requires more careful thought. 
Let me sum up. There are three senses of cognitive significance that may be posited to be consistent with 
positivist writings: cognitiveM significance, cognitiveL significance, and cognitiveP significance. A positivist 
theory of metaphor is non-cognitivist in the first sense. A positivist theory of metaphor is not non-cognitivist in 
the second sense and neither in the last sense. To retain consistency, though, in metaphorical contexts, where 
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factual or literal expressions are not used to speak factually or literally, such expressions may be taken to lack 
cognitiveL significance (as Carnap would have it). CognitiveL significance can be erased. But this is no 
impediment to positivism since it can be interpreted in a way that matches intuitive claims and experimental facts. 
Last, an attempt to connect the positivist metaphor theory to a historical sense of non-cognitivism via an 
entailment to a very specific and narrow form of psychological theory remains obscure. This isn’t a defence of 
positivism and there is no advocating for a positivist treatment of metaphor. This is an attempt to say in what 
senses a positivist theory of metaphor is non-cognitivist in a fair, unbiased, and charitable manner. Whether or 
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The Un-cancelable Literary Work:  
Does Literature’s Relational Ontology Assure Its Survival beyond Cancel Culture?  
 
Alena Govorounova, Gabi Lipede  
 
To Dump or Not to Dump Shakespeare, Aristotle and Plato into the Garbage Can of History?  
Cancel culture is not new. Indeed, in America one can rightly speak of cancel cultures. McCarthyism, for example, 
was itself a form of cancel culture with its demonization of communism. Various other efforts to silence 
countervailing perspectives critical of capitalism –-the most robust tradition of which is represented by Marxism 
– and forcibly remove these from the public sphere –- and certainly from economics departments in the United 
States — have enjoyed a lasting impact to the present day. The likely provisional cancellation of iconic literary 
works drawn principally from the classical Western canon can hardly compare to the wholesale erasure of 
socialism from the very history and genome of American social and political life.   
But the question raised by the most recent incarnation of cancel culture, particularly as it applies to works of 
imaginative literature, is one of limits. How do we know when we’ve gone too far? Clearly, we might put the 
same question to defenders of neoliberalism, for example, here defined as the extension of market values into all 
aspects of life. Commodifying human values and social relationships is a cancellation of a kind — a cancellation 
of intrinsic human value in favor of the extrinsic values determined by these newfound markets—dating markets, 
marriage markets, rental markets, and healthcare markets, etc. But we nevertheless wonder what cancel culture 
might do to Japan’s literature departments and the future of Japan’s humanities education in general should it 
succeed in gaining currency here. Will it succumb to many of the extremes we have witnessed in the West? Will 
it go as far as to cancel prince Genji of The Tale of Genji on the grounds of his “misconduct with women”? Will 
it cancel Momotarō (“peach boy”) from The Story of Peach Boy for exerting violence and hostility towards 
demons?  
If you think that the above proposition is some kind of a twisted joke, let me remind you that a growing 
number of wokei North American academics are currently debating whether or not to remove Shakespeare, 
Aristotle, Plato and other classics from syllabi at literature and philosophy courses. In fact, many professors and 
high school teachers have already removed works by these authors from their curricula resulting in much heated 
public debate on social mediaii. Shakespeare, Aristotle and Plato are allegedly “guilty” of white supremacy, 
intolerance, racism, misogyny, classism, toxic masculinity and other social evils. The next in queue to be canceled 
is the God of the Bible.iii 
So, let us take a quick glance at the newly revealed “evils” of Shakespeare, for example. In “To Teach or Not 
to Teach: Is Shakespeare Still Relevant to Today’s Students?” a Minnesota-based librarian, bookseller and 
freelance journalist Amanda MacGregor argues that “Shakespeare’s works are full of problematic, outdated ideas, 
with plenty of misogyny, racism, homophobia, classism, anti-Semitism, and misogynoir.iv Which raises the 
question: Is Shakespeare more valuable or relevant than myriad other authors who have written masterfully about 
anguish, love, history, comedy, and humanity in the past 400-odd years?”v English literature teachers need to 
“challenge the whiteness” of the assumption that Shakespeare’s works are “universal,” echoes Jeffrey Austin, 
the head of a Michigan high school’s English literature department.vi Former Washington state public school 
teacher Claire Bruncke banished Shakespeare from her classroom in order to “stray from centering the narrative 
of white, cisgender, heterosexual men.”vii Other teachers retain Shakespeare in their curriculum, but reinterpret 
his works in the light of the woke critique. Thus, Sarah Mulhern Gross, an English teacher at High Technology 
High School in Lincroft, NJ, said she was teaching “Romeo and Juliet” “with a side of toxic masculinity 
analysis.”viii  
What does it mean to “cancel” Shakespeare anyway? – one might wonder. It may imply many things – from 
removing the Bard from prominence in our collective consciousness, to removing his works from school and 
university curricula, to physically withdrawing his books from libraries and other public sources. As University 
of Chicago Emeritus Professor Jerry Coyne put it, “If English departments were like police departments, you 
could say that Shakespeare is getting “defunded.”ix So, how long before the literal defunding of Shakespeare really 
takes place – no more research grants devoted to Shakespeare – and will it gradually choke his works out of existence 
both within the academy and without?  
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But the more pressing question to ask is what will “canceling Shakespeare” do to our collective 
consciousness/unconsciousness as human beings? The American literary critic Harold Bloom argues that we should 
credit Shakespeare with no less than the invention of the human – hence, the title of his controversial book, 
Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (Forth Estate Ltd., 2008). According to Bloom, Shakespeare is 
responsible for the invention of the human, the inauguration of personality and consciousness as we understand it 
today.”x Not to mention that modern English is itself the language of Shakespeare – his works largely contributed 
to standardizing English grammar and rules in the 17th and 18th centuries.xi So, English literature departments should 
perhaps give careful consideration to this weighty matter: to read or not to read Shakespeare. To be or not to be as 
humans endowed with a more capacious consciousness.  
Headlines of the following kind emerge as one surfs the web for cancel culture news: “University Students 
Demand Philosophers such as Plato and Kant Be Removed from Syllabus because They Are White,” the title of 
the next article reads (The Telegraph, 2017).xii “Aristotle and Plato Must Go. After Targeting Statues, Race 
Activists Now Aim to Topple the Ancient Founders of Western Thought,” (RT: Question More, 2017).xiii 
Yet, many academics wrestle with cancel culture and try to justify one or another writer’s enduring place in 
the canon. Alexander Adams, the author of Iconoclasm, Identity Politics and the Erasure of History (Societas, 
2020), frames the issue in the following terms: “Decolonisation of the curriculum – the removal of white figures 
of note, to be replaced by figures of a different race, ethnicity or religion – is not a matter of principle but of 
power. It is a way of demonstrating your political faction has control of education and that you can make changes 
to damage, demean and remove icons of your supposed opponents. It is tactical and cynical. It is done to 
demoralize and divide. It is not a matter of empathy for the vulnerable but one of unconstrained expression of 
the ugliest emotions – ones which the ancient authors warned us to moderate. […] Depriving generations of the 
wisdom of the past is a recipe for a future racked by ignorance, intolerance and division. Anyone who has read 
the classics could have told us that.”xiv 
Agnes Callard, an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, also tries to rescue Aristotle 
from cancelation while admitting that his prominent status should be revised. “If cancellation is removal from a 
position of prominence on the basis of an ideological crime, it might appear that there is a case to be made for 
canceling Aristotle. He has much prominence: Thousands of years after his death, his ethical works continue to 
be taught as part of the basic philosophy curriculum offered in colleges and universities around the world.”xv Her 
sated reason for cancelling Aristotle is that he not only condoned slavery but “defended slavery as beneficial to 
the slave” and claimed that “women were incapable of authoritative decision-making.”xvi  
His views, as Callard admits, could be understood as mere empirical observation of the norms and values of 
his time. Callard eventually calls for a “friendly disagreement” with Aristotle and diagnosis cancel culture as 
“merely the logical extension of what we might call ‘messaging culture’, in which every speech act is classified 
as friend or foe, in which literal content can barely be communicated, and in which very little faith exists as to 
the rational faculties of those being spoken to.”xvii She calls for the return to “literal speech [that] employs 
systematically truth-directed methods of persuasion – argument and evidence.”xviii  
We nevertheless find the following statement by Callard troubling, “Yet I would defend Aristotle, and his 
place on philosophy syllabuses, by pointing to the benefits of engaging with him. He can help us identify the 
grounds of our own egalitarian commitments; and his ethical system may capture truths — for instance, about 
the importance of aiming for extraordinary excellence — that we have yet to incorporate into our own.”xix 
The above hardly represent an exhaustive list of reasons we should stick to Aristotle. One might add the 
outsized influence that Aristotle’s metaphysics, rhetoric and ethics had on Western culture. Moreover, it is 
because of Aristotle that most fields of science exist in the quality they do today. Modern biology, psychology, 
geology, mathematics, physics and political science also find their roots in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, 
cosmology and political philosophy respectively. He is the father of logic and formal reasoning and the modern 
scientific method originates from his concepts of inductive versus deductive reasoning. Aristotelian metaphysics 
had a great influence on Christian theology and Islam for many centuriesxx And the list goes on.  
Cancel culture’s logical inconsistencies are striking. Say, we de-canonize Aristotle for his “ideological crimes” 
of racism and misogyny. Say, we dismantle all “dead white men” from positions of prominence and throw them 
into the “garbage can of history,” (to utilize the rhetoric of the former Soviet censors of history) for their crimes 
of racism and misogyny. Today we see racism and misogyny as ultimate social evils. But what if our ideological 
climate changes? Let us imagine – hypothetically – that in a few decades we will evolve into a highly puritanical 
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society, in which marital infidelity, for example, is considered the highest form of social evil. Shall we then 
cancel Martin Luther King on the basis of his extramarital affairs? Every new generation will identify its own 
“ideological crimes,” thus, creating an inexhaustible array of reasons to cancel previous generations’ idols and 
heroes ad infinitum.  
Surely, we can see the irony here?  On the one hand, woke academics fight the tyranny of whiteness 
universalism (“Teachers should ‘go against the whiteness’ of the assumption that Shakespeare’s works are 
“universal.”)xxi  On the other hand, they create new woke universalism by appealing to our modern understanding 
of human rights as unquestionably universal, timeless and ahistorical.  
What happened to our respect and appreciation for cultural and historical relativism? Since when is it fair to 
offer an ahistoric critique of Aristotle for his views on slavery when it was all he knew two thousand four hundred 
years ago? I find the following statement by Callard particularly puzzling: “As I read him, Aristotle not only did 
not believe in the conception of intrinsic human dignity that grounds our modern commitment to human rights, 
he has a philosophy that cannot be squared with it.” No, he did not. He did not use a microwave, either. I really 
cannot see how Aristotle can be blamed for not sharing our current worldview.  
So, are there timeless universal human values or are there not? And if there are indeed, universal human 
values that transcend time, space and cultures, who gets to decide which values should be greenlighted and which 
values should be heavily policed?   
Meanwhile, fairy-tales like Cinderella and Snow White and are under fire for misogyny and nursery rhymes by 
Dr. Seuss such as And to Think that I Saw It on Mulberry Street are being canceled for racist imagery.xxii Anne 
Hathaway recently apologized to the disabled community for negatively portraying those with limb differences 
when playing the role of a fictional witch character in Robert Zemeckis’ adaptation of “The Witches” – a mythical 
creature with three prolonged fingers and exaggerated teeth. Keira Knightly would not allow her little daughter to 
watch Cinderella or The Little Mermaid: Cinderella is guilty of waiting for a prince to rescue her, and The Little 
Mermaid stupidly gave up her beautiful voice for a man.xxiii  
It is somewhat hard to process how fictional blobs and fairy-tale images can be ideologically censored. How did we 
come to reduce complex archetypal images like Cinderella and The Little Mermaid to one-dimensional political 
caricatures? Or how can we nonchalantly shake off crucial cultural signifiers that were birthed into being by the 
works of Shakespeare and Aristotle? What price will we pay for this cultural holocaust one day? Will the destruction 
of the very cultural signifiers that created and sustained our society for centuries survive this form of modern 
ostracism? How can we find a balance between the long-overdue decolonization of the canon, on the one hand, and 
a non-reductionist approach to the literary text on the other?  Perhaps it is time for us, as academics, to refresh our 
memory regarding the polyphonic nature of literary texts and the rich potentialities of the reader-response? Is there 
not more than one way to read a given text?  
Let me try to illustrate with the example from The Sleeping Beauty. The feminist reading of The Sleeping Beauty 
is pretty straightforward: a weak and feeble female cannot fend for herself and needs to wait for a prince to rescue 
her. How much more sexist can it get, really? And if this is not enough, a prince kisses a princess without her consent 
(!) while she is sleeping, God forbid – sexual harassment alert (!) and an ultimate patriarchal nightmare.  
A psychoanalytic reading of the same text, as proposed by public intellectual and Toronto University professor 
of psychology Jordan Petersonxxiv, suggests the reading of this text as an Oedipal allegory: the story of a mother 
(father) who devours her child by overprotecting her. The Sleeping Beauty is born to elderly parents and she is their 
only miracle child. Their urge to protect her from the terrors of the outside world is all-consuming. The king and 
the queen refuse to let their precious daughter face the real world. When Maleficent the witch (symbolically 
representing the dangers of this world) shows up at the little girl’s christening party, the king and the queen apologize 
for “forgetting” to invite her to the party and the witch is mad. You don’t forget about the dangers of this world 
when you have a child! You do not forget to invite Maleficent to the party! You want to teach your child about the 
world’s dangers and help her mature to be able to face the world on her own. You “forget” to invite the evil witch 
to the party only if you want your child to be unconscious, socially disabled and forever depend on you. And The 
Sleeping Beauty wants to be unconscious: she had been protected her whole life, she is naïve and scared and she 
wants to fall asleep and never wake up. Now she has to wait for the prince to come and rescue her. But the prince 
in this story is not just the actual man who comes to rescue the woman, no. The prince symbolically represents the 
woman’s own consciousness: she needs to wake herself up, she has to put her own masculine consciousness to the 
forefront so that she can survive in the world. Consciousness is frequently presented in stories as symbolically 
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masculine using the logos idea, that is, the idea that without this forward-going courageous consciousness the 
woman herself will drift into unconsciousness and terror. You can read The Sleeping Beauty as a story where “a 
sleeping woman needs a man to wake her up just as a sleeping man needs a woman to wake him up.” A prince, too, 
has to wake up from the sleep of the naïve and the damned: he has to fight the dragon and mature. On this reading 
of the fairy-tale, The Sleeping Beauty serves as an archetype of the female hero who overcomes her fears of the 
world and breaks through the debilitating constraints of her parents’ codependent relationship cycle. She represents 
maturity, courage and self-will. And The Sleeping Beauty story thus understood is a highly symbolic polyphonic 
text, which appeals to our deepest primordial psychological structures.   
Which of the above readings – the feminist or the psychoanalytic – is preferable? Which should be greenlighted? 
Which should be canceled? Clearly, this is a false dilemma. These two readings – and many others besides – can 
coexist in creative tension and create a constructive dialogue. Canceling the classics and children’s fairy-tales will 
not purge our semiotic systems of our moral shortcomings. But it may destroy deep-seated powerful imagery and 
cultural signifiers which have sustained our collective consciousness for millennia.  
 
Theoretical Analysis and Final Considerations 
Woke Hermeneutics’ Failure to Appreciate the Aesthetic Experience of Art and Literature 
Cancel culture’s campaign against targeted works of literature carries with it a certain number of implicit and 
untested hypotheses concerning (1) the nature of the literary arts; (2) the ostensibly benign impact that the 
cancellation of select works within more traditional canons will have on the continued flourishing of the literary 
arts; (3) and lastly and most topically the effectiveness of cancelation as a means of furthering cancel culture’s 
proscriptions and assuring more just and equitable outcomes for the least of these — that is, a running list of 
evermore minutely defined, oppressed socio-demographic groups. The few unstated hypotheses examined here, 
albeit cursorily, do not bare scrutiny and bode poorly for cancel culture as a research program and social agenda. 
This diagnosis is entirely consistent with cancel culture’s demonstrable success as a form a modern ostracism. In 
other words, I argue that the cancellation of select literary works will not move society in the direction of greater 
social justice, equity, and diversity. It would seem on the contrary to establish a precedent for a relentlessly 
chronic self-effacement: any work produced today can be cancelled tomorrow if it is found to offend the 
sensibilities of one or another of an ever minutely defined. An appraisal of cancel culture’s unstated hypotheses 
is therefore in order. Proposed correctives to cancel culture’s perceived theoretic shortcomings lead to the 
following:  (1) a renewed emphasis on aesthetics as the locus of productive literary inquiry, thereby deprioritizing 
political discourse about literature while paradoxically establishing a surer empirical ground on which to examine 
literature’s function as a potent vector for the propagation of sociopolitical values. For if works of art are effective 
vectors of social values it is in part due to (a) their markedness, to borrow an anthropological term, that is, their 
capacity to stand apart from other socio-cultural activities as emphatically atypical and thereby capture and retain 
the attention of beholders. Artists achieve markedness through the strategic use of various aesthetic devices; (b) 
equally noteworthy in this regard is the historic role that art has played across all cultures in mediating human 
interactions with the supernatural — a cognitive domain of human ability, on a purely naturalistic account, that 
is often coterminous with a given culture’s value system. In other words, art’s function as a potent vehicle for 
the dissemination of sociopolitical values can be understood in evolutionary terms as an exaptation — a 
repurposing of art’s  original putative, mediating function at the interface between mankind and the supernatural 
toward the promotion of values across a broader range of cultural domains — for example, the political sphere. 
In so far as all cultures have historically drawn heavily upon religious world views in order to establish their 
value systems, an extra-religious co-option of art’s proposed immanent function remains plausible, however 
speculative; and (2), an impractical ‘runaway ostracism’ or exponential increase in the things or states of things 
in the cultural universe against which cancel culture could potentially level its proscriptions using the various 
instruments at its disposal — namely, defunding and other more direct roles in defining public and private policies. 
I will touch upon these topics briefly in what follows. My analysis is, however, primarily concerned with what I 
here label ‘woke hermeneutics’ — namely, an interpretive approach devoted to the wholesale reduction of 
literature to political discourse, which in turn implies, more abstractly, the reduction of cultural artifacts whose 
immanent function is aesthetic to their discursive dimensions solely. Ultimately, I argue that a woke hermeneutic 
fails to apprehend literary works as works of art.  
― 107 ―
Champions of cancel culture within the academy endorse, at least implicitly, an a-theoretic approach to works of 
imaginative literature and works of art more broadly. Consequently, cancel culture’s woke hermeneutics usually 
involve a hypostatization of a given work of imaginative literature at the site of moral questioning: the moral 
issues raised by a given text, that is, its putative role in furthering inequities, injustice, the patriarchy, etc. become 
the whole story behind a text which, consequently, hypertrophies into an urgently cancelable monadic whole. 
Woke hermeneutics would, therefore, appear to involve a cognitive style in relation to literary works that is better 
suited to pragmatic texts. And in fact, woke hermeneutics reduce literary works to banal messages. This 
interpretive approach is hardly prohibited; however, it breaks with the nature of literary works as works of art. 
This fact combined with woke hermeneutics’ impoverished implicit ontological theory of the literary work run 
precisely counter to literature’s status as a culturally and historically privileged locus for aesthetic experience, 
which we will define in keeping with recent work in cognitive poetics as a polyphonic attentional mode. 
Attention in the aesthetic mode so defined reactivates the polyphonic relations and potentiality endemic to 
written language that are deliberately exploited by the artist resulting in an artistic reading of the literary text. In 
theory, written languages’ stratified nature is such that even pragmatic texts can similarly give rise to the 
polyphonic attentional modes outlined above. Pragmatic texts have not been designed to maximize either the 
polyphonic vertical play between the strata that make up the texts or the horizontal associations a reader might 
establish between the text and the universe outside of the text or other texts.  
A failure to engage with a literary text by adopting a polyphonic cognitive style results in the reduction of 
the text to given that the artistic exploitation of the stratified nature of written language does not compromise the 
text’s constituent discursive elements. One is hardly prohibited from reading a literary work in this vain. A poem 
can be read as merely a simple message. And indeed, cancel culture’s strident declamations about select authors 
and literary works quickly devolve into interpretive orthodoxy about a given text for the same reason. This is 
hardly the product of an artistic reading as defined above. You can only cancel these works on the altar of their 
purported ideological crimes to the extent that you fail to engage with them as works of art.  
It is clearly the case that pragmatic texts also lend themselves to a variety of interpretations. Legal texts, 
philosophical essays, religious tracts are hardly interpretively neutral; however, these texts are also bound to a 
means ends type logic — they serve some instrumental, extrinsic function which does not critically depend on 
the pleasure derived in reading them and they are evaluated on the basis of criteria which are not strictly aesthetic. 
In contrast, the immanent function of a literary text is aesthetic pleasure — the pleasure or displeasure derived in 
reading the text in fact dictates whether or not the reader will continue to engage with the literary text in question. 
We don’t stop reading legal texts, instruction manuals, letters from estranged loved ones, medical documents, 
emails, etc. simply because we fail to derive pleasure in reading them. They respond to so many extrinsic 
instrumental values that we must respond to as conscious, free moral agents. Literary texts, however, fulfil first 
and foremost their aesthetic function. Note that woke readings of these same literary texts adopt the cognitive 
style outlined above in relation to pragmatic texts and are therefore more appropriately characterized as 
schematized, convergent and bottom-up. In consequence, woke readings quickly devolve into orthodoxy.  
 
Are Virtual Texts Cancelable?  
 It is uncertain how the cancelation of specific texts in their materialized form — be it digital or analog — will 
help further the struggle toward a more equitable, just and diverse society. To borrow an oft cited example from 
the philosophy of art, if we were to tragically rid the world of every material impression of the score for 
Beethoven's 9th symphony it can hardly be said that this specific musical work would somehow cease to exist. 
Beethoven’s 9th enjoys a virtual presence in our culture that is in no longer anchored to notes on a page or other 
strictly material semiotic media. Virtual instantiations of the text persist albeit in a diminished form as objects of 
aesthetic contemplation and can nevertheless survive the cultural holocausts aimed strictly at their destruction as 
material artifacts. This argument cannot be easily extended to include Shakespeare’s Hamlet or Hart Crane’s The 
Bridge short of committing these works to memory. Some genres, for example, the folk tale are more 
spontaneously and readily virtualized. But cancel culture is hardly concerned with literary works as objects of 
aesthetic contemplation.  
In the absence of any single theory or body of theories advanced by champions of cancel culture in support 
of a more optimistic future for their research program and social agenda, the preceding should naturally lead to 
a kind of nihilism about cancel culture’s stated aims. For how can cancel culture help move us as a society toward 
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greater freedom, equity, justice if it cannot ultimately apprehend the very harbingers of injustice and oppression 
it has identified in so many literary texts. Assuming of course that the text is in fact a harbinger of inequality, 
injustice, etc. that these moral failings are somehow intrinsic to it and that cancel culture’s interpretation of a text 
is not also itself activated by the vagaries of specific cultural and historical contexts, extrinsic to the text itself, 
that bias and inform woke hermeneutics from the outset. Cancel culture’s hypostatization of semantic content — 
it’s misplaced concreteness — assumes that meaning must necessarily inhere in the text itself rather than be 
projected onto the text from without. Cancel culture knows no pragmatics. If it did, it might be encouraged to 
multiply its potential targets exponentially and move in the direction of a more thoroughgoing, society-wide 
semiotic purge. Instead, cancel culture’s woke hermeneutic belies an impoverished implicit theory of cultural 
evolution one in which the causal arrow is assumed to run unilaterally from the literary work to the world. [A 
strangely anti-dialectical proposition to be sure given cancel culture’s roots in Marxist literary theory.]  
 
Will Cancel Culture Liberate Us Eventually?  
It is, therefore, unclear what impact cancellation will ultimately have in moving us toward a more just and 
equitable society. If champions of cancel culture within the academy were to grapple with these matters seriously, 
they might perhaps take aim at particular readings of texts as opposed to the texts themselves. Instead, cancel 
culture’s cancellations — impotent to effect the societal change they purport to carry out — amount to little more 
than public acts of moral absolution – all too easily compared with Pagan sacrificial rites in which the victims 
themselves are believed to be guilty of the evils projected onto them. Regretfully, a universally redemptive, 
Christian sacrificial moment — to be performed once and never again — is nowhere in sight. A Hegelian dialectic 
has predictably emerged here: the liberation of one group translates into the oppression of another group. Cancel 
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